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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
__________________________________________
)
)
BMG RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (US)
)
LLC, and ROUND HILL MUSIC LP,
)
Civil No. 1:14-cv-1611
)
Plaintiffs,
)
Hon. Liam O’Grady
)
v.
)
)
COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., and
)
COXCOM, LLC,
)
)
Defendants.
__________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this copyright action, the putative owners of more than 1,400 musical composition
copyrights seek to hold Cox Communications, Inc. and Cox Com, LLC (collectively, “Cox”)
contributorily and vicariously liable for alleged copyright infringement taking place over its
high-speed internet service. At the close of extensive discovery, the parties cross-moved for
summary judgment. Following oral argument, the Court issued an Order (Dkt. No. 675) granting
in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 310) and
denying Cox’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 305) for the reasons stated in this
memorandum opinion.

I. Background
Cox provides high-speed internet service to customers nationwide. Plaintiffs BMG
Rights Management (US), LLC (“BMG”) and Round Hill Music LP are the putative owners or
administrators of approximately 1,400 musical composition copyrights. Plaintiffs allege users of
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Cox internet service employ BitTorrent, a type of peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file sharing, to illegally
upload and download music files, thereby violating Plaintiffs’ exclusive rights.
A.

BitTorrent
The innovation of P2P file sharing is that it allows “user’s computers [to] communicate

directly with each other,” rather than through a central server. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). All P2P protocols have “one thing in common:
a decentralized infrastructure whereby each participant in the network (typically called a ‘peer,’
but sometimes called a ‘node’) acts as both a supplier and consumer of information resources.”
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2013). While P2P
protocols have many benefits and non-infringing uses, see Grokster, 545 U.S. at 920 (noting that
P2P networks are “employed to store and distribute files by universities, government agencies,
corporations, and libraries, among others”), they have also been harnessed for less meritorious
purposes by “those wanting access to pirated media, [such as] music, movies, and television
shows.” Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 710 F.3d at 1025.
The BitTorrent protocol is unique in “how it facilitates file transfers.” Id. at 1026.
BitTorrent breaks files into pieces, which “permits users to download lots of different pieces at
the same time from different peers.” Id. It also allows users to begin sharing before the
complete file has downloaded, meaning “at any given time, each user is both downloading and
uploading several different pieces of a file from and to multiple other users.” Id. at 1027.
B.

Rightscorp, Inc.
Plaintiffs enlisted Rightscorp, Inc. (“Rightscorp”) as their agent to identify infringing

uses of their copyrighted works. Rightscorp’s software searches websites that index torrent files
and identifies files that appear to contain one or more of the Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.
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Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 19. A torrent file does not actually contain any content. Id. ¶ 18. It contains
metadata about the files available to be distributed and other information that allows Rightscorp
to contact a tracker and find peers offering torrent payloads that contain the files. Id. If
Rightscorp contacts a peer and determines that the peer has the torrent payload, Rightscorp will
record the date, time, the peer’s IP address, the port on the peer’s computer through which the
connection was made, the torrent file’s unique hash value, and the name of the copyrighted work.
Pls.’ SAMF ¶ 7. Rightscorp then sends a notice of infringement to the internet service provider
associated with the recorded IP address. Id. According to Plaintiffs, Rightscorp sent Cox 2.5
million notices corresponding to instances in which Cox internet users offered one of Plaintiffs’
copyrighted works for download. 1 Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs also contend that Rightscorp downloaded
more than 100,000 full copies of music files that violated Plaintiffs’ musical composition
copyrights from peers through Cox’s internet service. Id. ¶ 10.
C.

Cox’s Copyright Policy and Graduated Response Procedure
Cox’s Acceptable Use Policy (“AUP”) provides that account holders may not use Cox’s

internet service “to post, copy, transmit, or disseminate any content that infringes the patents,
copyrights, trade secrets, trademark, moral rights, or propriety rights of any party.” Theodore
Decl. Ex. 10; Trickey Decl. ¶ 11. The AUP further provides that “[v]iolation of any terms of this
AUP may result in the immediate suspension or termination of either . . . access to the Service
1

This number is disputed. Rightscorp asserts that during the time period relevant to this
litigation, an infringement notice issued only when Rightscorp’s software confirmed that a peer
was offering 100% of its payload. Rightscorp admits that beginning in December 2014, after the
filing of this lawsuit, it began sending notices when a payload contained anywhere between 10%
and 100%. Because a torrent payload may contain hundreds of files, establishing that a peer is
offering 10% of a payload is not a guarantee that the work identified in a notice was in fact in the
payload. Cox claims that over 500,000 of the 2.5 million notices were issued after the lawsuit
was filed and therefore, for at least some of those notices, the peer did not actually have the
allegedly infringing file. Cox also argues that Rightscorp cannot establish that it was utilizing a
100% bitfield threshold during the time period relevant to the suit.
3

and/or [the] Cox account.” Theodore Decl. Ex. 10; Trickey Decl. ¶ 11. Cox informs account
holders of the policy in subscriber agreements. Trickey Decl. ¶ 12. The terms on Cox’s website
also incorporate the AUP’s policy by reference. Id. ¶ 13.
Cox’s abuse department handles misconduct on Cox’s network. Abuse ranges from
copyright infringement to hacking to excessive bandwidth usage. Pls.’ SUMF ¶ 17. Cox offers
copyright owners an email address, abuse@cox.net, to which they can send notices of
infringement. Beck Decl. ¶ 3. Cox processes the notices it receives using a largely automated
system called CATS—Cox Abuse Tracking System. Pls.’ SUMF ¶ 19. CATS scans the
messages in the inbox and culls certain information, such as the date of the alleged abuse, the IP
address, and so on. Beck Decl. ¶ 7. That information is then used to create a “ticket.” Id. ¶ 3.
Three features of the CATS system are worth mentioning. First, when Cox receives
multiple complaints in one day for a single account, the tickets are “rolled up,” meaning Cox
counts only the first ticket. Id. ¶ 8 & n.4; Zabek Decl. ¶ 9; Theodore Decl. Ex. 1 at 155–56.
Second, Cox imposes a “hard limit” on the number of complaints a complainant can submit that
will receive customer-facing action. Beck Decl. ¶ 8. If a complainant exceeds the hard limit,
CATS automatically sends an email informing the complainant that the daily limit has been
reached and the tickets created from those emails are automatically closed. Theodore Decl. Ex.
42 at 7. The default limit is 200 complaints per complainant per day, but Cox says it will work
with a complainant to set a reasonable number. Id.; Zabeck Decl. ¶ 30. Cox claims such limits
are necessary to keep the number of complaints at a manageable capacity for staff and to prevent
a single complainant from overwhelming the company. Beck Decl. ¶ 10. Third, Cox defines its
“abuse cycle” in 180-day periods. Theodore Decl. Ex. 17 at 2. While Cox maintains a record of
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its customers’ full ticket histories, if no complaints are received within six months from the last
complaint, the cycle restarts. Id.; Zabek Decl. ¶ 9.
Cox handles tickets generated by CATS according to its graduated response procedure.
Beck Decl. ¶ 12; Theodore Decl. Ex. 39 at 10; id. Ex. 17. This process, which Cox does not
publicize to customers, progresses from warnings to suspensions and ultimately, the possibility
of termination. Theodore Decl. Ex. 17 at 11–12. Cox takes no action on an account’s first ticket
because a “substantial percentage” of accounts never receive a second complaint within one
abuse cycle. Zabek Decl. ¶ 9; Theodore Decl. Ex. 17 at 11; id. Ex. 39 at 13. When a second
complaint arrives, CATS generates an email to the account holder that includes a letter from Cox
explaining the alleged infringement as well as the complete text of the infringement notice Cox
received from the copyright owner. 2 Beck Decl. ¶ 12; Zabek Decl. ¶ 9. When Cox has “rolled
up” complaints over the course of a day, CATS will only send the first complaint received that
day. Beck Decl. ¶ 12 n.9. This process of sending an email warning repeats on the third, fourth,
fifth, sixth, and seventh complaints Cox receives for an account within a six-month period.
Theodore Decl. Ex. 17 at 11.
When Cox receives an eighth notice, it suspends the account and places the account
holder in what Cox calls a “soft-walled garden.” Beck Decl. ¶ 9. That means the account
holder’s internet access is temporarily limited to a single webpage that displays a warning
message. Id.; Zabeck Decl. ¶ 9. The account holder can exit the soft-walled garden and selfreactivate service by clicking a link on the webpage. Beck Decl. Ex. 3 (“After deleting the files
and disabling file sharing, you may click here to reactivate your service.” (emphasis omitted));

2

If there is no email address on record for the customer, Cox skips the warning stage and
moves directly to suspensions. Theodore Decl. Ex. 17 at 12; Beck Decl. ¶ 9 n.10.
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Theodore Decl. Ex. 17 at 11; id. Ex. 2 at 178–79. On the ninth complaint, the account holder is
again sent to the soft-walled garden. Beck Decl. ¶ 9; Theodore Decl. Ex. 17 at 11.
The tenth complaint results in what Cox calls a “hard-walled garden.” Beck Decl. ¶ 9.
The account holder is now directed to a webpage with instructions to call Cox customer service.
Theodore Decl. Ex. 17 at 11. When the account holder calls Cox, he or she can request
reactivation. Id.; id. Ex. 1 at 73. The eleventh complaint is the same. Id. Ex. 17 at 11. The
twelfth and thirteenth complaints also place account holders in the hard-walled garden, but now
they must speak to higher-level Cox customer service representatives to request reactivation. Id.;
id. Ex. 1 at 79–80. When Cox receives the fourteenth complaint in an abuse cycle, it will review
the full account history and consider termination. Id. Ex. 17 at 12. Termination is never
automatic, however, and is left to the discretion of Cox employees. Beck Decl. ¶ 13. In the
“vast majority” of cases, Cox says it is able to address the behavior triggering the infringement
notices during the preliminary steps and never has to reach the “drastic measure” of terminating
service. Zabek Decl. ¶¶ 9, 14.
D.

Cox’s Rejection of Rightscorp’s Notices
Rightscorp includes within its standard infringement notice an offer of settlement.

Specifically, the notices say, “This notice is an offer of settlement. If you click on the link below
and login to the Rightscorp, Inc. automated settlement system, for $10.00 [or $20.00] per
infringement, you will receive a legal release from the copyright owner.” Beck Decl. Ex. 6. As
a policy, Cox does not accept or process infringement notices that contain settlement offers.
Beck Decl. ¶ 17–18; Zabek Decl. ¶ 31. Cox’s in-house privacy counsel set the policy after
concluding that such notices are improper and fall outside the “spirit” of the DMCA. Theodore
Decl. Ex. 5 at 77–78; Zabek Decl. ¶ 31.
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When Cox receives a complaint with a settlement offer, it asks the complainant to
conform the notice and explains that the notice will not be forwarded unless and until it is
amended. Beck Decl. ¶ 17; Zabeck Decl. ¶ 34. Until a complainant complies, Cox “blacklists”
all complaints received from that complainant by configuring CATS to auto-delete messages
received from that complainant’s email address. Beck Decl. ¶ 17.
On March 9, 2011, Cox received its first notice of infringement from Rightscorp. Id.
¶ 19. Cox asked Rightscorp to remove its settlement offers, but Rightscorp declined to do so and
continued to send Cox notices. Zabek Decl. ¶¶ 32, 35; id. Ex. 13. On March 14, Cox blacklisted
Rightscorp, meaning from that point on, Cox auto-deleted Rightscorp’s emails and never
retrieved the information from the body of those notices. Beck Decl. ¶ 20; Theodore Decl. Ex.
41 at 10, 12–13. The following October, Cox claims Rightscorp “started inundating” its inbox,
sending as many as 24,000 notices in one day. Beck Decl. ¶ 21; Zabek Decl. ¶ 33. In response,
Cox blocked Rightscorp. Blocking messages goes one step beyond blacklisting: now
Rightscorp’s notices never even entered Cox’s inbox. Theodore Decl. Ex. 2 at 339–40; id. Ex.
41 at 10, 13; Beck Decl. ¶ 21. When a complainant is blacklisted, Cox still has a record of the
emails received and deleted. When a complainant is blocked at the server level, there is no
record of any message received. Theodore Decl. Ex. 41 at 10.
E.

Procedural Background
In November 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit against Cox alleging contributory and vicarious

copyright infringement for direct infringements occurring between February 2012 and November
2014. As relief, Plaintiffs seek statutory damages, injunctive relief, fees, and costs. 3 In its
answer, Cox asserted a number of defenses, including, as is relevant here, eligibility for a
3

The First Amended Complaint elected both actual and statutory damages. Plaintiffs
made clear in subsequent motions that they only seek statutory damages.
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liability-limiting safe harbor in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). After
extensive and contentious discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos.
305, 310). On October 29, 2015, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on the limited issue of
Plaintiff Round Hill Music LP’s standing. (Dkt. No. 501). The following day, the Court heard
oral argument. The motions are now fully briefed and ripe for consideration.

II. Analysis
Plaintiffs seek to hold Cox liable for the direct infringing activities of individuals using
Cox’s internet service. “Although the Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another, . . . doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common
law principles and are well established in the law.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (internal
quotations, alteration, and citations omitted). Plaintiffs invoke two theories of secondary
liability: contributory and vicarious infringement. “One infringes contributorily by inducing or
encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement
while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.” Id. (citations omitted).
After setting out the applicable standard of review, the Court addresses each motion for
summary judgment separately, as it must. See Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C.,
630 F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 2011).
A.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A
genuine issue of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, a court finds
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” McAirlaids, Inc. v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 2010). “It is an axiom that in ruling on a
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motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Tolan v.
Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although
the Court “must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, it is ultimately the nonmovant’s burden to persuade [the Court] that there is indeed a
dispute of material fact.” CoreTel Va., LLC v. Verizon Va., LLC, 752 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir.
2014). That showing requires “more than a scintilla of evidence—and not merely conclusory
allegations or speculation—upon which a jury could properly find in its favor.” Id.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on two issues. First, Plaintiffs seek a

ruling that they own the copyrights at issue. Second, Plaintiffs ask the Court to find as a matter
of law that Cox is not entitled to protection under the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions. Cox
opposes the motion and asks the Court to deny the motion or alternatively enter summary
judgment in its favor on both issues.
1.

Ownership

To establish a claim of infringement, Plaintiffs must establish their ownership of the
1,421 musical composition copyrights allegedly infringed. 4 See Univ. Furniture Int’l, Inc. v.
Collezione Europa USA, 618 F.3d 417, 428 (4th Cir. 2010). The copyrights at issue can be
broken down into four groups: (1) copyrights with certificates of registration that list BMG as the
claimant; (2) copyrights with certificates of registration that list a BMG predecessor as the
claimant; (3) copyrights that BMG purchased or otherwise acquired from third parties; and

4

Plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment states there
are 1,422 copyrights at issue, but Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew one copyright in their reply
brief. See Pls.’ Reply at 5 n.3.
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(4) copyrights with certificates of registration that list Round Hill Music, LLC as the claimant
and copyrights that Round Hill Music, LLC purchased or otherwise acquired from third parties.
Cox challenges Plaintiffs’ ability to establish ownership as to each category and instead asks the
Court to enter summary judgment on the element of ownership in its favor. See Defs.’ Opp’n at
24.
a.

Copyrights That List BMG as the Claimant on the Certificate of
Registration

For this first category of copyrights, Plaintiffs have produced certificates of registration
that list BMG as the claimant. See Briggs Decl. Apps. A1–A7, A13 (composition titles and
copyright registration numbers); id. Exs. B1–B137, B391, B934 (certificates). The Copyright
Act provides that “[i]n any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or
within five years after the first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of
the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
Included in the facts entitled to the presumption of validity is ownership. Univ. Furniture Int’l,
Inc., 618 F.3d at 428. Because Plaintiffs produced the certificates they have met their initial
burden, and the burden shifts to Cox to “prove that the claimed copyrights are invalid.” Id.
(citing M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 434 (4th Cir. 1986)).
Cox agrees that the copyright registrations create a rebuttable presumption of ownership,
see Defs.’ Opp’n at 25, but it contends that the evidence needed to rebut the presumption and
shift the burden back to Plaintiffs to conclusively establish ownership is not heavy. Indeed, the
Fourth Circuit has cautioned that “the Copyright Office’s practice of summarily issuing
registrations . . . counsels against placing too much weight on registrations as proof of a valid
copyright,” and has instructed “reviewing court[s to] assess other relevant indicia of ownership,
such as the parties’ intent and the terms of transfer agreements and other documents establishing
10

a chain of title.” Univ. Furniture Int’l, Inc., 618 F.3d at 428; see also 3-12 Nimmer on Copyright
§ 12.11 (“[A]lthough certain prima facie presumptions are thereby created, the courts are free to
examine the underlying facts and to rebut those presumptions, should the facts so warrant.”).
The question, then, is whether Cox has come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut
Plaintiffs’ prima facie case of ownership or create a genuine issue of material fact as to
ownership. Cox argues that testimony by BMG’s Vice President of Copyright Administration,
Robert Briggs, about BMG’s registration process undermines the presumption of validity.
Specifically, Cox claims the testimony establishes that BMG does not check to see if it owns
copyrights before it registers them. In response, Plaintiffs argue that Cox greatly
mischaracterizes Briggs’s testimony and that the testimony is insufficient to rebut the
presumption.
During his deposition, Briggs was asked whether and how BMG verifies its ownership of
a copyright prior to filing a registration application. When asked whether BMG checks to see if
there is a valid assignment agreement before filing the registration, Briggs responded, “I can’t
say specifically,” and “[g]enerally, this is speculation on my part but I think that they are not
checking each song.” Bridges Decl. Ex. 19 at 23. He also testified that he did not know whether
BMG has or checks its files for complete documentation of ownership following registration.
But Briggs also explained that when a “song is delivered to our department, it’s delivered by
departments who are working on an understanding that there is an active agreement with that
writer or client.” Id. He also said that those active agreements are in place before the songs are
delivered and before the applications are filed for registration. And although he testified that it
was his understanding that BMG has asked for a correction of a copyright ownership after
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discovering errors with respect to copyright ownership, Briggs did not know of any specific
examples of that happening.
When Briggs’s testimony is read in full, it is not enough to cast doubt on BMG’s
ownership. Although “a defendant sued for infringement ‘must simply offer some evidence or
proof to dispute or deny the plaintiff’s prima facie case of infringement,’” Palladium Music, Inc.
v. EatSleepMusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Entm’t Res. Grp., Inc. v.
Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997)), a finding that Briggs’s
testimony is sufficient would render the statutory presumption meaningless. “[M]ore than
conjecture is required to rebut the presumption,” 3-12 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.11 n.28.18,
and conjecture is all that Cox offers from the testimony. Cox has presented no “specific
evidence that rebuts the presumption of validity which attaches to a duly issue[d] registration.”
Complex Sys., Inc. v. ABN Ambro Bank N.V., 979 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Because there is insufficient evidence in the record to rebut the presumption, the Court grants
Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the copyrights that list BMG as
the claimant on the certificate of registration.
b.

Copyrights That List a Predecessor of BMG as the Claimant on the
Certificate of Registration

The next group of copyrights lists a BMG predecessor entity as the claimant on the
certificates of registration. See Briggs Decl. Apps. A8–A12, A14–A19, A20–A33, A36
(composition titles and registration numbers); id. Exs. B138–B390, B392–B700, B704, B932–
B933 (certificates). Because BMG is not listed as the claimant, Plaintiffs must produce
additional evidence of the chain of title from the claimant listed on the registration to BMG.
To meet their burden, Plaintiffs have produced both the certificates of registration and the
merger and acquisition agreements between BMG and the entity (or a d/b/a of the entity) listed
12

as the claimant on the certificates. See Briggs Decl. Exs. 1–12. Cox makes two general
challenges to the chain of title evidence. First, Cox contends that the Court should require the
chain of title to extend beyond the claimant listed on the certificate to the original author of the
work. Second, Cox argues that the merger and acquisition agreements produced by Plaintiffs are
insufficient to establish chain of title because they do not specify the individual works acquired.
See Defs.’ Opp’n at 28 (“Without conclusive evidence of which songs it acquired through
mergers, BMG cannot prove that it owns the . . . works.”). Neither argument is persuasive.
There is no basis for Cox’s argument that the chain of title must relate back to the author
instead of the original claimant. The weight of authority supports finding the latter sufficient.
See 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01 (“The only evidence required of the plaintiff, in addition
to the registration certificate, is evidence of plaintiff’s chain of title from the original copyright
registrant.” (emphasis added)); see also Montgomery Cty. Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo
Master Corp., 878 F. Supp. 804, 809–10 (D. Md. 1995) (quoting Nimmer for the proposition that
the evidence of chain of title is “from the original copyright registrant”), aff’d, 91 F.3d 132 (4th
Cir. 1996). Moreover, the only case cited by Cox did not require the plaintiff to establish a chain
of title to the author. Cox quotes language from In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191
F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2002), that “plaintiffs need to produce chain of title from the
listed author to themselves.” But the court went on to find that the plaintiff’s production of an
agreement between the copyright claimant and the plaintiff was sufficient to establish chain of
title. See id.
Cox’s second argument is that Plaintiffs cannot establish ownership because the merger
agreements do not list the specific copyrights acquired. Cox cites no authority for the
proposition that the writing used to transfer copyrights must list the specific assets acquired.
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Moreover, there is an exception to the Copyright Act’s general requirement that the transfer of
exclusive rights be made in writing where such a transfer occurs by “operation of law.”
17 U.S.C. § 204(a). In Universal Furniture International, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, the
Fourth Circuit recognized that “although the Copyright Act generally requires a writing to
transfer copyright ownership, it makes exceptions for transfers that occur by ‘operation of law.’”
618 F.3d at 429 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 204(a)). The court went on to note that “certain of our
sister circuits have ruled that mergers transfer copyrights ‘by operation of law’ and obviate the
writing requirement.” Id. (citing Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958,
963 (8th Cir. 2005), and Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718,
721 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689
F.3d 29, 41 (1st Cir. 2012). If no writing is required to transfer copyright ownership in a merger,
Cox cannot be correct that there must be a list of the specific copyrights acquired. See Design
Basics, L.L.C. v. DeShano Cos., Inc., No. 10-14419, 2012 WL 4321313, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich.
2012) (finding plaintiff established ownership with certificate of registration and proof of
merger). The Court finds Plaintiffs have established ownership by the production of the
certificates of registration and the relevant merger and acquisition agreements.
Finally, Cox disputes five individual copyrights in this category. In response, Plaintiffs
withdrew their claim of ownership as to one copyright, see Pls.’ Reply at 5 n.3 (withdrawing
Exhibit B403), but argue that the remaining challenges are baseless. The Court agrees. Cox first
disputes the copyright for “Call of the Zombie,” see Briggs Decl. Ex. B468, because “Bug
Music” (a BMG predecessor) is handwritten under “claimant” on the certificate of registration.
Plaintiffs respond that the handwritten name is immaterial. Neither party cites any authority on
this point. The Court need not decide whether a handwritten notation would be sufficient to
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undermine a claim of ownership because the unofficial copyright registration available on the
public catalog, of which the Court may take judicial notice, 5 also lists Bug Music as the
claimant. See Roberts Decl. Ex. 3. Cox next challenges the copyrights for “Hotel,” see Briggs
Decl. Ex. B568, “Clones,” see id. Ex. B704, and “Cocaina,” see id. Ex. B587, on the ground that
a BMG predecessor is not listed as a claimant on the registrations. The certificate for “Hotel”
lists Hitco South as a claimant. Hitco South is a d/b/a of BMG predecessor Hitco Music
Publishing LLC. Id. ¶ 37. The certificate for “Clones” lists Trio Music Co Inc., which is a d/b/a
of BMG predecessor, Bug Music, Inc. See id. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs concede that the exhibit with the
registration for “Cocaina” is “inadvertently missing two pages,” but they ask the Court to take
judicial notice of the unofficial copyright registration. Pls. Reply at 5 n.3. The unofficial
registration lists Music of Windswept, see Roberts Decl. Ex. 2, which is a d/b/a of BMG
predecessor Windswept Holdings, LLC. See Briggs Decl. ¶ 38. The Court takes judicial notice
of the public catalog entry.
There is no genuine issue of material fact as to the ownership of these copyrights.
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to this category of copyrights, with
the exception of the withdrawn claim of ownership as to Exhibit B403.

5

See Island Software & Comp. Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 261 (2d Cir.
2005) (“The district court was entitled to take judicial notice of Microsoft’s federal copyright
registrations, as published in the Copyright Office’s registry.”); White v. Alcon Film Fund, LLC,
52 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1316 n.9 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (“While a copy of the original registration would
be preferable, courts have taken judicial notice of true and correct copies of the Copyright
Office’s online record of registration . . . .”); Liberty Media Hldgs., LLC v. Tabora, No. 12 Civ.
2234, 2012 WL 2711381, at *1 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2012) (“[T]he public catalog entry with
respect to that certificate is a proper subject of judicial notice in the absence of any dispute or
reason to dispute its accuracy.”).
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c.

Copyrights That BMG Purchased or Otherwise Acquired from Third
Parties

The third category consists of copyrights that BMG (or a BMG predecessor) purchased or
otherwise acquired from third parties. Plaintiffs have produced the certificates of registration for
these works, see Briggs Decl. Apps. A35, A37–102; id. Exs. B702–B703, B705–B931, and the
underlying purchase agreements, see id. Exs. 8–9, 13–105. 6 Additionally, Robert Briggs
testified to the acquisitions in his declaration. See Briggs Decl. ¶¶ 41–125. Cox challenges the
chain of title with respect to the works listed in Appendices A37, A40, A42, A44–A46, A48–
A52, A54, A57–A60, A62–A64, A66, A73, A74, A76, A77, A79, A83–A89, A91, A95–A98,
and A100–102 7 to the Briggs declaration. Defs.’ Opp’n at 29–30. Because Cox does not raise a
challenge to those works in the appendices not listed, the Court grants summary judgment to
Plaintiffs as to the ownership of those works. 8
Cox first argues that “BMG relies on incomplete co-publication or administration
agreements.” Id. at 29. These agreements, Cox argues, “grant BMG various rights to songs in
attachments that do not exist” and thus “do not establish chain of title because they do not
identify the objects of a transfer.” Id. As examples, Cox cites two agreements that assign
exclusive rights to copyrights to be listed in an attachment but that fail to include the named
attachment. Relatedly, Cox argues that BMG “relies on vague agreements that also fail to
6

There are three types of agreements: (1) Asset Purchase Agreements (or Songwriter
and/or Copyright Purchase Agreements), which transfer ownership; (2) Publishing and CoPublishing Agreements, which convey some percentage of the copyright; and (3) Exclusive
Administration Agreements.
7

Cox’s brief challenges ownership of works listed in Appendix A103 and A104, but the
Court’s copy of the Briggs Declaration ends at Appendix A102.
8

Specifically, summary judgment is granted as to ownership of the works listed in A35,
A38, A39, A41, A43, A47, A53, A55, A61, A65, A67–A72, A75, A78, A80–A82, A90, A92–
A94, and A99.
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identify the works.” Id. As examples, Cox cites agreements that give BMG rights “to any and
all compositions,” to works acquired after the agreement, and to “all musical compositions,
including but not limited to” works listed in a non-existent schedule. Id. These agreements, Cox
contends, fail to establish a chain of title because they likewise do not identify which songs were
transferred.
Plaintiffs respond that each agreement meets the Copyright Act’s requirement that
transfers of ownership by assignment or exclusive license be signed and in writing. See 17
U.S.C. § 204(a). There is no requirement, they argue, that each work be identified, and they note
that Cox does not cite to a single case or other authority supporting such a proposition. Indeed,
courts often say that “a qualifying writing under Section 204(a) need not contain an elaborate
explanation nor any particular ‘magic words,’ but must simply show an agreement to transfer
copyright.” Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 722 F.3d 591, 600
(4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Effects Assocs.,
Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It doesn’t have to be the Magna Charta; a oneline pro forma statement will do.”).
Even assuming that to satisfy the chain-of-title requirement Plaintiffs must submit
evidence of the specific copyrights covered by each agreement, they have done so via declaration
testimony. For instance, Cox cites Exhibit 29, a Music Publishing Administration Agreement
between John Legend Music, Inc. and BMG, as an example of an incomplete agreement. The
agreement gives BMG exclusive rights to administer the musical compositions listed in Annex 1,
but Annex 1 is left blank. In his declaration, Briggs testified that the agreement relates to the
twenty-five works listed in Appendix A25. See Briggs Decl. ¶¶ 60–61. There is similar
testimony relating to each transaction. Cf. Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, No. 06 CV

17

5936, 2011 WL 1641978, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2011) (finding declaration testimony
sufficient to supplement the chain of title). Cox’s mere denial of these facts is not sufficient to
rebut the presumption of ownership or to create a genuine issue of material fact. 9 See id. (“A
non-movant ‘may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits
supporting the motion are not credible, or upon mere allegations or denials of the nonmoving
party’s pleading.” (quoting Ying Jing Gan v. City of N.Y., 996 F.2d 522, 532–33 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Finally, Cox argues that “BMG relies on a few agreements that allegedly transferred to
rights from others [sic] to BMG but those other parties appear nowhere in the agreements.”
Defs.’ Opp’n at 30 (citing Briggs Decl. Exs. A76, A77, A89, A95, A101). It is not entirely clear
what Cox is arguing here, but Plaintiffs address each challenged agreement in their reply and
identify the parties to the transfers. Pls.’ Reply at 6–7.
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the ownership of the
copyrights in this category.
d.

Copyrights That List Round Hill Music, LLC as the Claimant and
Copyrights That Round Hill Music, LLC Purchased or Otherwise
Acquired from Third Parties

The final category consists of (1) copyrights that list Round Hill Music, LLC as the
claimant on the copyright registrations and (2) copyrights that Round Hill Music, LLC purchased
or otherwise acquired from third parties. Gillis Decl. Apps. A1–A5 (composition titles and
registration numbers); id. Exs. C1–C22 (certificates); id. Exs. RH4–RH7 (purchase agreements).
Cox argues that Plaintiff Round Hill Music LP (not to be confused with Round Hill Music, LLC)

9

Cox raises multiple evidentiary objections to Briggs’s declaration. See Defs.’ Opp’n at
2–3. The Court has reviewed the declaration and overrules these objections. Briggs is a proper
representative to testify to corporate documents regarding the ownership issues raised and the
Court finds his declaration reliable.
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is not the legal or beneficial owner of any exclusive right associated with these copyrights and
thus has no standing to sue for infringement under the Copyright Act. 10
Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act provides that only “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of
an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement of
that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.” 17 U.S.C. § 501(b); see also
X-It Prods., L.L.C. v. Walter Kidde Portable Equip., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 577, 602 (E.D. Va.
2001). Section 106 lists the six exclusive rights available under a copyright. 11 That list is
exhaustive. Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 795 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.
10

Cox also disputes Plaintiffs’ assertion that the certificates of registration as to the first
sub-category of Round Hill copyrights list “Round Hill Music, LLC” as the claimant. Because
the Court agrees with Cox that Round Hill Music LP is without standing, there is no need to
reach this argument.
11

Section 106 provides, in pertinent part:

Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
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2015). Thus, a plaintiff with the right to take actions that are merely incidental to copyright
ownership without any accompanying interest in one of § 106’s rights does not have standing to
bring an infringement claim. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th
Cir. 2005). Although § 106 is exhaustive, each exclusive right is transferable. Section 101
defines a “transfer of copyright ownership” as “an assignment, . . . exclusive license, or any other
conveyance . . . of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is
limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In
other words, “either an assignment (which transfers legal title to the transferee) or an exclusive
license (which transfers an exclusive permission to use to the transferee) qualifies as a ‘transfer’
of a right in a copyright for purposes of the Act.” Minden Pictures, Inc., 795 F.3d at 1003.
Moreover, each exclusive right is further divisible and “any subdivision of any right specified by
section 106, may be transferred . . . and owned separately.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2).
Plaintiffs do not contend that Round Hill Music LP was assigned legal title to any of the
copyrights at issue. They claim Round Hill Music LP was given an exclusive license to use each
of the copyrights at issue for any and all of the exclusive rights listed in § 106. Thus, it must be
the case that Round Hill Music LP not only “received one or more divisible rights,” but also that
its interest in those rights is exclusive—that is, Round Hill Music LP is “entitled to enforce
them.” 12 HyperQuest, Inc. v. N’Site Solutions, Inc., 632 F.3d 377, 383 (7th Cir. 2011). To make

12

After reviewing the parties’ initial arguments on this issue, the Court determined that
additional briefing was necessary on the limited issue of standing. The Court issued an Order
directing the parties to
(1) address what, if any, exclusive right(s) Round Hill Music, LP holds with
respect to the copyrights at issue and the nature of the transfer of those rights from
Round Hill Music Royalty Fund, LP (i.e., whether there was an assignment of
title to an exclusive right(s) or an exclusive license granted); (2) identify the
strongest case law in support of their respective readings of the rights, if any,
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this determination, the Court looks to “the substance of what was given to the licensee and not
the label that the parties put on the agreement.” Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. v. Blue Moon
Ventures, No. 3:10-1160, 2011 WL 662691, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 14, 2011); see also
HyperQuest, Inc., 632 F.3d at 383.
Three agreements are relevant here. The first is the Asset Purchase Agreement that
assigned the copyrights from Round Hill Music, LLC, the entity listed on the copyright
registrations, to Round Hill Music Royalty Fund LP (the “Fund”). See Gillis Decl. Ex. RH1. It
is undisputed that the Fund owns legal title to the copyrights.
The second is the Third Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of
Round Hill Music Royalty Fund LP (the “Fund Agreement”). See id. Ex. RH2. The Fund
Agreement created a limited partnership consisting of a general partner—Round Hill Music
Royalty Fund GP LP (the “General Partner”)—and a sole limited partner—Joshua Gruss. The
Fund Agreement states that “management of the Partnership shall be vested exclusively in the
General Partner . . . and the General Partner shall have full control over the business, assets,
conduct and affairs of the Partnership.” Id. at 32. The agreement also contemplates the
appointment of a Management Company “to manage the affairs of the Partnership,” id. at 29, and
a Copyright Administrator, defined as “any Person (including an Affiliate of the General Partner)
employed or retained by the Partnership and at the Partnership’s expense, to provide services in
connection with the administration, preparation and processing or any similar service of any

conveyed by the agreements attached as Exhibits RH2 and RH3 to the Gillis
Declaration; and (3) address the breadth of the principle barring challenges by
alleged third-party infringers to transfers of exclusive rights (i.e., the Eden Toys
principle) and its application to Defendants’ standing challenge in this case.
(Dkt. No. 501).
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copyrights owned by, or assigned to, the Partnership.” Id. at 6. With respect to the role of
Copyright Administrator, the Fund Agreement also states:
The Partnership will retain the Copyright Administrator, which may be an
Affiliate of the General Partner, to provide the services of administrator of the
copyrights owned by or assigned to the Partnership. The Copyright Administrator
will be responsible for day-to-day administrative services relating to the
Partnership’s portfolio and will be reimbursed for its services.
Id. at 31.
The third relevant agreement, executed the same day as the Fund Agreement, is the
Management Agreement. See Gillis Decl. Ex. RH3. The Management Agreement was entered
into by the Fund, the General Partner, and Plaintiff Round Hill Music LP. Id. at 1. It appointed
Round Hill Music LP as the Management Company, and within that role, the Copyright
Administrator. See id. (appointing Round Hill Music LP to “provide management or other
services, including acting as a Copyright Administrator”). The agreement further states that “[i]n
performing the services pursuant to [the] Agreement, the Manager [Round Hill Music LP] . . .
shall have the same rights, duties and obligations, and shall observe the same standards of care,
as would be applicable to the General Partner if it (and not the Manager) were providing the
services performed by the Manager.” Id.
Plaintiffs rely on the combined effect of the Fund Agreement’s grant to the General
Partner of “full control over the . . . assets” and the Management Agreement’s statement that
Round Hill Music LP “shall have the same rights, duties and obligations” as the General Partner.
Putting the two together, Plaintiffs claim the Fund gave Round Hill Music LP “the exclusive
ownership rights to administer and exploit the copyrights,” Gruss Decl. ¶ 3, including “all of the
exclusive rights described in . . . § 106.” Pls.’ Supp. Memo. in Supp. at 4.

22

The Court disagrees. The plain language of the agreements only gives Round Hill Music
LP the “same rights” as the General Partner—including “full control over the . . . assets”—when
it is “providing the services performed by the Manager.” Thus, the language begs the question of
what “services” the Manager, and within that role, the Copyright Administrator, performs with
respect to the copyrights. There is little, if any, indication that these “services” performed
contemplated the transfer any legally cognizable right in any of the copyrights, much less that
such permission was exclusive. The Fund Agreement explains the role of Copyright
Administrator as “provid[ing] the services of administrator of copyrights.” Gillis Decl. Ex. RH2
at 31. But the responsibilities listed are “day-to-day administrative services” for which the
Copyright Administrator will be reimbursed. Id. Similarly, the agreement defines Copyright
Administrator as an entity “provid[ing] services in connection with the administration,
preparation and process or any similar service of any copyrights” owned by the Partnership. Id.
at 6. While Plaintiffs are correct that administration agreements can transfer a sufficient
ownership interest, there is no other indication aside from the word “administration” that
suggests the agreement transferred any interest at all. There is no reference, for example, to any
of the actions contemplated by § 106—for example, the right to reproduce or distribute. Instead,
the word “administration” is surrounded by language that paints Round Hill Music LP’s role as
administrative and acting directly on behalf of the Partnership.
The language in the agreements aligns much more closely with Cox’s contention that the
Fund merely hired Round Hill Music LP “to provide services related to copyrights it did not
own” and that “[t]his employment did not result in any assignment of rights to” Plaintiff. Defs.’
Opp’n at 25. As the Southern District of New York recently noted, “Considering the
preeminence of exclusive rights in copyright cases, it is axiomatic that if the . . . Agreement did
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not specify that exclusive rights were being transferred, no such rights were in fact transferred.”
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo, 998 F. Supp. 2d 262, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Even assuming that the agreements did convey a license to use the copyrights, there is no
indication that the license was exclusive. An exclusive license is transferred when an “individual
or entity is given the right to use a copyright” and “the owner promises not to convey that right
to anyone outside of those persons or entities who have an interest in the license.”
Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 2011 WL 662691, at *4 (quoting I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d
768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996)). In other words, there is no indication of a “further promise[] that the
same permission will not be given to others.” Minden Pictures, Inc., 795 F.3d at 1005 (quoting
I.A.E., Inc., 74 F.3d at 775) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs also rely on the declaration of Joshua Gruss, the managing member of the
Round Hill entities, in which he testified that “[s]ince the Management Agreement was executed,
Round Hill LP has acted as the exclusive worldwide administrator of the copyrights and other
properties owned by the Partnership. No other individual or entity, including the Partnership,
has acted or has the right to act as the administrator of its copyrights, including those at issue in
this case.” Gruss Decl. ¶ 5. As noted above, the Court looks to the substance of the agreements
to determine whether standing exists and not the post hoc label placed on the agreements by
Plaintiffs. The plain language of the agreements does not support finding a transfer of any
exclusive license. Nor is Gruss’s declaration particularly helpful, as it does not shed any light on
what the role of “exclusive worldwide administrator” entails.
Rather than attempting to explain what language in the agreements conveyed an
exclusive license, Plaintiffs devoted most of their initial briefing to challenging Cox’s ability to
make its standing challenge. Plaintiffs cite a line of cases that say an alleged third-party
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infringer cannot attempt to avoid liability by arguing that an underlying assignment of copyright
failed to comply with the Copyright Act’s writing requirement. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (“A
transfer of copyright ownership . . . is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance . . . is in
writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed . . . .”). The principle arose out of cases
where there had been an oral transfer of rights and the question was whether a later written
memorialization of the transfer was sufficient to comply with the writing requirement. Because
the purpose § 204 is to resolve disputes between transferors and transferees, those courts
concluded that “it would be anomalous to permit a third party infringer to invoke this [writing]
provision against the licensee.” Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d
27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982); see also X-It Prods., 155 F. Supp. 2d at 603–04 (citing Eden Toys and
collecting cases that support the proposition that “an oral assignment of copyright rights is an
effective assignment if the oral assignment is subsequently memorialized in a written
document”).
Plaintiffs ask the Court to apply this principle broadly and hold that Cox, as an alleged
third-party infringer, cannot challenge the assignment between the Fund and Round Hill Music
LP because there is no dispute between them regarding what was transferred. The Court does
not believe the principle extends as far as Plaintiffs urge. Cox is not invoking § 204’s writing
requirement or relying on the informality of the transfer to avoid liability. Rather, it is pointing
to the language within the written agreements and asking if that language conveyed the type of
right necessary to support standing to bring an infringement claim. See Marya v.
Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., No. CV13-4460, 2015 WL 5568497, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22,
2015) (“Eden Toys do[es] not stand for the proposition that so long as an alleged transferor and
transferee say that a transfer occurred, a third-party has no choice but to take them at their word.
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Rather, these cases stand for the proposition that, if there is evidence of a transfer, the
informality with which the transfer was conducted does not prevent the transferee from asserting
an interest in the copyright.”). Accordingly, Cox’s challenge is permissible.
Because Round Hill Music LP does not co-own the copyrights or have an exclusive
license for any use of the copyrights, it is without standing to bring this infringement action.
Accordingly, the Court finds Round Hill Music LP cannot proceed in this action and its claims
for infringement against Cox are dismissed.
2.

DMCA Safe-Harbor Defense

BMG also moves for summary judgment on Cox’s entitlement to its DMCA safe-harbor
defense. 13 Specifically, BMG contends Cox cannot meet the statute’s threshold requirement that
internet service providers (“ISPs”) adopt and reasonably implement a repeat infringer policy.
After providing an overview of the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions, the Court turns to Cox’s
policies and practices.
a.

Statutory Framework

Title II of the DMCA, titled the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act,
was Congress’s answer to the potentially enormous liability that ISPs faced for the materials
being transmitted over their networks. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27
(2d Cir. 2013). To that end, Congress created four safe harbors that protect ISPs from liability
for copyright infringement when their involvement is limited to certain activities—transitory
digital networking communications, system caching, information residing on systems or
networks at the direction of users, and information location tools. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)–(d).
Cox invokes the first of these safe harbors, § 512(a), which “limits the liability of ISPs when
13

Because Round Hill Music LP is without standing, the remainder of this opinion refers
to BMG as the sole plaintiff.
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they do nothing more than transmit, route, or provide connections for copyrighted material—that
is, when the ISP is a mere conduit for transmission.” In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d
771, 775 (8th Cir. 2005).
To benefit from any one of the safe harbors, Congress imposed certain threshold
requirements on all ISPs. As is relevant here, a service provider must demonstrate that it has
“adopted and reasonably implemented, and informed subscribers and account holders of the
service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network
who are repeat infringers.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). The requirement that service providers
implement a repeat-infringer policy is a “fundamental safeguard for copyright owners” and
“essential to maintain[ing] the strong incentives for service providers to prevent their services
from becoming safe havens or conduits for known repeat copyright infringers.” Capitol
Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The dispute in this case centers on what it means for a service provider to “reasonably
implement[]” its policy. The phrase is not defined in the statute. In deciphering its meaning,
courts have split the phrase into two separate requirements: (1) whether a service provider
implemented its policy; and (2) whether that implementation was reasonable. See, e.g., Perfect
10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2010). Courts have identified several
“threshold functions” that must be present in order for a service provider to implement any
repeat-infringer policy. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No 11-20427, 2013 WL 6336286,
at *21 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). For example, a service provider must have a “working
notification system” and “a procedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant notifications,” and the
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provider must “not actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information needed to
issue such notifications.” CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1109. Additionally, the penalty imposed for
repeat infringers (when appropriate circumstances exist) must be termination and not some lesser
consequence. See Capital Records, LLC v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., No. 12-cv-6646, 2015 WL
1402049, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. March 25, 2015).
A service provider’s implementation is reasonable if it terminates a repeat infringer’s
access in appropriate circumstances. See CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1111. This raises the dual
questions of when a service provider should consider a subscriber or account holder to be a
repeat infringer and when circumstances become appropriate for termination. As Professor
Nimmer points out, “repeat infringer” could have a number of meanings. On one end of the
spectrum, an infringer could be “an adjudicated copyright infringer.” See 4-12B Nimmer on
Copyright § 12B.10. In the middle may be someone against whom an unadjudicated charge has
been made, but the service provider has actual knowledge of, or is aware of facts and
circumstances suggesting, infringement. On the other end, an infringer could be someone
against whom “an unadjudicated charge of infringement has been preferred.” Id. Although Cox
asks the Court to hold that one can be labeled an infringer only when adjudicated as such, the
Court finds no support in caselaw for that interpretation. Instead, courts have articulated a
knowledge standard: “A policy is unreasonable . . . if the service provider failed to respond when
it had knowledge of the infringement.” CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1113 (emphasis added); see
also MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (“While knowledge is not an element of copyright
infringement, it is relevant to a service provider’s decision whether appropriate circumstances
exist to terminate a user’s account.”).
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Even if a service provider has knowledge of infringement, however, the Act requires
termination only in “appropriate circumstances.” The inclusion of this phrase implies that there
are some circumstances under which termination of a repeat infringer may not be appropriate.
For example, courts have noted that there are different degrees of online copyright infringement,
from the inadvertent and noncommercial, to the willful and commercial. See H.R. Rep. 105–
551, pt. 2 at 61 (1998). Another common benchmark, taken from the House and Senate Reports,
is that “those who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse their access to the Internet through disrespect
for intellectual property rights of others should know that there is a realistic threat of losing that
access.” Id. Thus, appropriate circumstances clearly cover account holders who repeatedly or
flagrantly infringe copyright, particularly infringement of a willful and commercial nature. See
Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Equally clear
is that this standard cannot be applied in such a way as to impose an affirmative duty on service
providers to monitor for infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall
be construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on . . . a service
provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing
activity . . . .”); CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1111 (“To identify and terminate repeat infringers, a
service provider need not affirmatively police its users for evidence of repeat infringement.”).
In sum, the Court finds § 512(i) covers, “at a minimum, instances where a service
provider is given sufficient evidence to create actual knowledge of blatant, repeat infringement
by particular users, particularly infringement of a willful and commercial nature.” 14 Cybernet

14

In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, the Ninth Circuit imported the knowledge standard
in § 512(c)’s safe harbor into its determination of whether the service provider was reasonably
implementing its repeat infringer policy. 488 F.3d at 1113–14. Section 512(c) contains both an
actual knowledge and a red-flag knowledge standard. At the summary judgment hearing, Cox
argued that the knowledge standards contained in § 512(c) cannot be applied in this case because
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Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1104 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (“Because it does not have an affirmative duty to police its users,
failure to properly implement an infringement policy requires a showing of instances where a
service provider fails to terminate a user even though it has sufficient evidence to create actual
knowledge of that user’s blatant, repeat infringement of a willful and commercial nature.”).
b.

Application

BMG identifies three reasons why Cox did not reasonably implement its repeat infringer
policy. First, BMG says Cox cannot be said to be implementing its policy if it refuses to accept
Rightscorp’s infringement notices merely because they contain settlement offers. And even
beyond Cox’s blanket refusal to forward those notices to its account holders, BMG argues it is
also unreasonable that Cox makes no effort to record the other information contained in the
notices, such as the date and time of the infringing activity and the account holder’s IP address.
Second, BMG argues that with millions of subscribers, Cox’s use of a “hard limit” on the
number of infringement notices it will receive in a twenty-four-hour period is additional
evidence of unreasonableness. Third, BMG argues that Cox does not terminate access of repeat
infringers under appropriate circumstances.
The Court finds this last ground sufficient, standing alone, to bar Cox from invoking the
DMCA’s protection. 15 Accordingly, there is no need to decide whether Cox’s refusal to receive

Cox is relying on § 512(a) not § 512(c). There is no need to decide whether red-flag knowledge
would be sufficient in this case because, as explained below, Cox had subjective knowledge of
specific repeat infringements by its account holders. That is enough under an actual knowledge
standard.
15

Because Cox was not acting on or receiving Rightscorp’s notices, the Court’s analysis
focuses on how Cox treated notices of infringement received from third-party copyright owners.
As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “Section 512(i)(1)(A) requires an assessment of the service
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notices with settlement agreements or its “hard limit” on the number of notices received might
also render Cox ineligible for a safe harbor. In assessing Cox’s termination of repeat infringers,
the Court divides Cox’s practices into two time periods: before the fall of 2012 and after.
i. Cox Did Not Implement a Repeat Infringer Policy Before Fall 2012
The record conclusively establishes that before the fall of 2012 Cox did not implement its
repeat infringer policy. Instead, Cox publicly purported to comply with its policy, while
privately disparaging and intentionally circumventing the DMCA’s requirements. Cox
employees followed an unwritten policy put in place by senior members of Cox’s abuse group by
which accounts used to repeatedly infringe copyrights would be nominally terminated, only to be
reactivated upon request. Once these accounts were reactivated, customers were given clean
slates, meaning the next notice of infringement Cox received linked to those accounts would be
considered the first in Cox’s graduate response procedure.
Numerous emails in the record, portions of which are reproduced below, support these
conclusions. Even viewed in the light most favorable to Cox, the Court finds the contents of the
emails cannot be explained away. Cox’s attempts to recast the emails are unavailing. Nor can
they be pinned on low level employees whose views had no real significance. The name that
appears again and again on these emails is Jason Zabek, Cox’s Manager of Customer Abuse
Operations.
In 2009, Zabek sent an email titled, “DMCA Terminations,” to the abuse group that said:
As we move forward in this challenging time we want to hold on to every
subscriber we can. With this in mind if a customer is terminated for DMCA, you
are able to reactivate them after you give them a stern warning about violating our
AUP and the DMCA. We must still terminate in order for us to be in compliance
provider’s ‘policy,’ not how the service provider treated a particular copyright holder.” CCBill
LLC, 488 F.3d at 1113.
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with safe harbor but once termination is complete, we have fulfilled our
obligation. After you reactivate them the DMCA ‘counter’ restarts; The
procedure restarts with the sending of warning letters, just like a first offense.
This is to be an unwritten semi-policy . . . We do not talk about it or give the
subscriber any indication that reactivating them is normal. Use your best
judgment and remember to do what is right for our company and subscribers. . . .
This only pertains to DMCA violations. It does not pertain to spammers, hackers,
etc.
Theodore Decl. Ex. 18.
In a January 2010 email exchange, Zabek was asked by an employee what to do in the
following scenario:
Customer had several email warnings, followed by suspensions up to TOC
[technical operations center] and was terminated December 8th. Voicemail call
back on January 7th shows I explained to the account holder [redacted] they could
request review in 6 months for possible reactivation. ICOMS notes shows
[redacted] called about the bill January 11 and got reinstated. We already have a
DMCA complaint . . . .
Id. Ex. 19. In other words, this customer had progressed through Cox’s graduated response
procedure and Cox had ultimately determined appropriate circumstances existed to terminate this
customer for six months. One month into the termination, the customer was reactivated and soon
thereafter, Cox received another notice of infringement tied to the account.
This was Zabek’s response:
This is fine. If asked, I would have allowed them back on. We have been turning
customers back on who have been terminated for DMCA complaints. As long as
our process of warnings, suspen[sion], then termination is followed, we can turn
the customer back on and start the DMCA count over. During this time, as we try
to keep customers and gain more RGU’s [revenue generating units] it is important
to try and balance the needs of the company with the protection of the network.
DMCA does not hurt the network like DOS attack, spam or hacking. It is not
something we advertise however.
Id.
In a series of emails in June of that year, a customer service representative asked whether
she needed the abuse group’s “okay” to reactivate an account after “a customer is terminated for
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the first time.” Id. Ex. 20. Zabek responded: “If it is for DMCA you can go ahead and
reactivate. Any other issues (hacking, spam, etc.) give[] us a heads up and we can all look at it
together.” Id. In the same chain, another Cox employee wrote: “[I]n 99% of the cases we are
going to turn the customer back on. . . . [I]n that 1% of the cases, the customer will not reactivate
at their own discretion.” Id.
In August, a representative sent the abuse group an email to confirm that, after a
customer is terminated and then reactivated, the next complaint Cox received “is to be treated as
a brand new complaint” and the customer is to be “given a clean slate.” Id. Ex. 21. Zabek
responded:
Internal info only. Do not forward. After termination of DMCA, if you do
suspend someone for another DMCA violation, you are not wrong. However, if
the customer has a cox.net email we would like to start the warning cycle over,
hold for more, etc. A clean slate if you will. This way, we can collect a few extra
weeks of payments for their account. ;-) Once the customer has been terminated
for DMCA, we have fulfilled the obligation of the DMCA safe harbor and can
start over. . . . We have some leeway here. But know that once a termination
happens, we have fulfilled “safe harbor.” These are not in our procedures as we
do not make this information publicly known.
Id.; see also id. Ex. 2 at 201, 222 (confirming that the process would begin anew following
reactivation).
In March 2011, a customer service representative sent Zabek an email, saying: “Spoke to
the customer this morning and he flat out is refusing to do anything on his side and insists
nothing is coming from it despite multiple tickets. . . . If possible, please give me some insight
on where we should go from this point; ie suspension or something of the sort.” Id. Ex. 24. This
was Zabek’s instruction:
You can of course suspend but I would suggest that you just forward any DMCA
complaints to his email. . . . He just has to realize that we must send these to him.
If a copyright holder dec[ides] to sue, then we want to make sure the customer
knows why . . . . And it is the law. Make sense? I am not concerned about
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DMCA and not ready to terminate a CB customer for it . . . yet. It does not cause
a big problem on the network. Not like spam, Dos attacks, hacking, etc. do . . .
The customer is doing this on purpose. I just know it (I can feel it) and is not
owned IMO. They just want to steal stuff . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
In another March email, a representative emailed Zabek: “Here is another example of a
customer that I consider a[] habitual abuser. In a year was terminated twice and turned back on.
I suspended him again since no e-mail address and according to procedure he start over [sic] in
the process.” Id. Ex. 45 (emphasis added). Zabek responded, “It is fine. We need the
customers.” Id. In an April exchange, a customer service representative sent this inquiry: “This
is the customers [sic] third termination. He is waiting call [sic]. What do I tell him when I call
him?” Id. Ex. 22. Zabek wrote, “DMCA = reactivate,” and then by separate email, “You can
make him wait a day or so if you want. ;-)[.]” Id.
In August, Brent Beck, a software engineer, wrote, “I understand that recently the
termination procedure has been relaxed a bit, so as to involve suspending the customer’s modem
instead of removing the services (since most are reactivated, this was faster and easier).” Id. Ex.
46. In the same email chain, Zabek wrote, “Remember that we must terminate to receive
protection under the save [sic] harbor amendment.” Id. Joseph Sikes, Cox’s Senior Lead Abuse
Engineer, added, “Yep, right, we sure do. But I don’t believe the TOC is actually terminating the
service, completely removing it in ICOMS. They are just clicking Terminate and Update Ticket,
which shows a Termination in the Customers Ticket History.” Id.
A January 2012 AOL instant messenger conversation between Sikes and Beck discussed
the meaning of the term, “soft terminate.” Id. Ex. 13. When asked what a “soft term” was, Sikes
explained: “basically, a suspension that is called a termination with the likelihood of
reactivation.” Id. Then he said, “for DMCA – we don’t want to loose [sic] the revenue.” Id.
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And in response to further questions from Beck, Sikes said, “this is a relatively new process that
we’ve been doing for the past year, again, to retain revenue.” Id. Sikes warned Beck that the
“Hard/Soft verbiage stays amongst us only. . . . It’s kind of an ‘under the table’ procedure, again,
to preserve revenues, when we were loosing [sic] Subscribers, but it only happens about once per
month.” Id. Finally, a February 2012 email from a Cox employee to the abuse group said, “I
was chatting with Daryl and it seems no one has let them know in SAN that DMCA Terms are
not really Terminations any longer.” Id. Ex. 52 (emphasis added).
To implement the repeat infringer policy contemplated by § 512(i), the penalty imposed
by service providers must be termination. Terminate means “[t]o put an end to; to bring to an
end.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Service providers cannot skirt the termination
requirement by imposing something short of complete termination of a subscriber or account
holder. The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently examined the
DMCA’s termination requirement and reasoned that the “definition suggests that Congress
intended service providers to have a policy in place that would end or discontinue the accounts of
repeat infringers, not something short of that such as limiting repeat infringers’ user privileges.”
Capital Records, LLC, 2015 WL 1402049, at *10 (emphasis added). That is exactly what Cox
did. In Zabek’s words, “DMCA = reactivate.” Theodore Decl. Ex. 22. Although Cox asserts
that “its policy has always been to terminate account holders in appropriate circumstances,”
Defs.’ Opp’n at 22, that bare assertion is not enough to defeat summary judgment.
The Fourth Circuit has said that the immunity granted by Congress to service providers
“is not presumptive” and is to be “granted only to innocent service providers.” ALS Scan, Inc. v.
RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
emails in the record strip Cox of any innocence. They make clear that it was Cox’s policy to
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intentionally circumvent the DMCA. Despite having a repeat-infringer policy on the books,
Cox’s implementation rendered the policy an “absolute mirage.” In re Aimster Copyright Litig.,
252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 659 n.18 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); see also
MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (“Thus, service providers that purposefully . . . fail to
terminate users despite their persistent and flagrant infringement are not eligible for protection
under the safe harbor.”). In sum, no reasonable juror could find that Cox implemented a repeatinfringer policy before the fall of 2012.
ii. Cox Did Not Reasonably Implement Its Repeat Infringer Policy After
the Fall of 2012
In October 2012, Cox added two additional suspension steps to its graduated response
procedure. See Theodore Decl. Ex. 39 at 10–13. BMG concedes that around the same time that
Cox adopted these new procedures, Cox abandoned its tacit “DMCA = reactivate” policy. Now
when Cox terminated a customer, it meant complete termination of access for six months.16 The
problem, BMG contends, is that in place of the fake terminations, Cox stopped terminating
customers altogether. In other words, now that termination would mean losing a customer, BMG
alleges Cox would not terminate even when Cox knew that a customer was repeatedly and
blatantly violating copyrights. As evidence, BMG points to (1) the drop-off in the number of
terminations following the policy shift; and (2) emails documenting specific instances in which
Cox personnel did not terminate account holders despite having knowledge that the account
holder was repeatedly infringing.

16

The emails from this period evidence a shift to real terminations. In a 2012 email,
Sikes wrote, “Now, when we terminate Customers, we REALLY terminate the Customer (for 6
months).” Theodore Decl. Ex. 23. And in the same email chain, he wrote, “[Employee] may not
have been aware that we now terminate, for real. He’s been out of the loop, for a while. We’ll
get him on the same page.” Id.
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The numbers bear out BMG’s first argument. From January 2010 until August 2012,
Cox terminated an average of 15.5 account holders a month. Theodore Decl. Ex. 39 at 25–27.
Between September 2012 and November 2014 when this suit was filed, Cox terminated an
average of 0.8 accounts per month, with a total of 22 terminations. 17 Id. In that same period,
Cox took approximately 711,000 customer-facing actions—meaning Cox issued 711,000 email
warnings and suspensions—in response to alleged infringements. Id. That number does not
include the number of first complaints Cox received for each account because Cox takes no
action on those. Cox also admits that of the 22 terminated accounts, 17 of those had also either
failed to pay their bills on time or were excessive bandwidth users. Pls.’ SUMF 66, 68. Were
these numbers all BMG had, the Court could not grant summary judgment. An inference that
Cox was not reasonably implementing its policy may be drawn from the numbers. But “that
conclusion is not compelled by the evidence.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 993 F. Supp.
2d 1192, 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
BMG has also presented evidence of specific instances in which Cox did not terminate
account holders despite knowing that they were using Cox’s service to repeatedly infringe. For
instance, in a March 2014 exchange, a customer service representative wrote, “Customer has
been told multiple times that he needs to secure his open wireless router. He has also been
warned that the next complaint can result in termination of service.” Roberts Decl. Ex. 6. Sikes
responded, “Yep, this is their absolute last chance to either secure their wireless router and/or
remove ALL P2P clients from their systems. Next complaint = 6 month termination.” Id. A
few weeks later, the same service representative emailed to say, “Last ticket . . . customer was
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In the three months after the suit was filed, Cox terminated an average of 11.6
customers per month. Theodore Decl. Ex. 39 at 27.
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warned that further complaints would result in termination. We have received an additional
complaint.” Id. Ex. 5.
Sikes responded:
[I]t looks like the Customer suspected that their wireless network was the culprit.
I assume you also covered the likely possibility that it could also be a BitTorrent
client running on one of their computers? If this was not covered thoroughly in
the last call with them, please advise them that securing their wireless network
obviously did not work. So, the BitTorrent client is running on one of their
computers (their child’s, etc.) and they need to uninstall it. This customer pays us
over $400/month and if we terminate their service, they will likely cancel the rest
of their services. Every terminated Customer becomes lost revenue and a
potential Detractor to our Net Promoter Score. We should make absolutely
certain that we have covered each and every possibility with them (“to the bitter
end”) before we terminate them. If all of this has been covered in detail, then
please go ahead and terminate their internet service for this complaint.
Id. The rep responded, “Looks like PTP programs were discussed back on ticket 15711339
(Which was also a final suspension as well).” Id. Sikes responded,
That was back in October 2013 [approximately five months earlier]. We can’t
expect our Customers to know and remember as much as we do about this stuff,
especially if the account holder is not the one using BitTorrent. . . . On this
Customer’s last suspension . . ., at the beginning of this month (March 5th), did
you also explain that they should still check all of the computers in their
household for BitTorrent clients and to speak with other members of their
household . . . about running/installing BitTorrent and downloading/sharing files?
You only mentioned their wireless network in your work log notes. On final
suspensions, we need to be as detailed as possible on the work log notes, show
that we have covered EVERYTHING with the Customer. On 404 suspensions for
DMCA, this is our last ditch effort to save the Customer. Obviously, if they don’t
care and don’t want to help us help them, there’s not much more we can do, but
this should also be noted in the work log notes.
Id. 18 After a service representative responded that the customer had been told about file sharing
and torrents, Sikes decided, “Please suspend this Customer, one LAST time.” Id.
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“404” refers to the area code in Atlanta, Georgia. This means the customer had been
through the final suspension steps where he or she was required to speak with Cox’s high-level
customer service representatives. Theodore Decl. Ex. 1 at 79–80.
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In May, a representative sent an email to the abuse group that said, “Request for
termination review—Cats Ticket 19991279. This is the 3rd time to the 404 number. Was warned
on last call that next offense would result in termination review. Notes indicate that customer
was advised to remove file sharing program on last call.” Theodore Decl. Ex. 49. Sikes
responded, “Since this Customer knows ‘it’s his fault’, [sic] please ask this Customer what he
will do to prevent this from happening again and note it in the ticket work log. Then let him
know that one more complaint will result in a 6 month Termination.” Id.
In June, a senior engineer in the abuse group said this about a customer who had been
given a final suspension and advised to remove all P2P file-sharing programs: “This customer
will likely fail again, but let’s give him one more change [sic]. [H]e pays 317.63 a month.” Id.
Ex. 34. Also in June, a customer service representative emailed the abuse group about a
different customer, saying, “This customer is well aware of his actions and is upset that ‘after
years of doing this’ he is now getting caught. Customer was advised to shop sharing, check his
wireless and remove his PTP programs.” Id. Ex. 47. Sikes responded, “Please advise this
Customer that this is their final termination & reactivation. If we receive one more complaint,
we will, regretfully, not be able to provide them with data service for 6 months.” Id.
Thus, BMG has identified specific instances in which Cox knew accounts were being
used repeatedly for infringing activity yet failed to terminate. Cox does not seriously challenge
these examples. Labeling them as “nothing more than conjecture and hyperbole,” Cox argues
that these “snippets of conversations do not show what actions call centers actually took against
accounts.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 22. Cox, of course, is careful never to assert that these customers
were in fact terminated. As BMG notes in its reply, “no conjecture is required—not one of these
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subscribers or their abuse ticket numbers can be found on the list of terminated subscribers Cox
did produce.” Pls.’ Reply at 11. n.7.
Instead, Cox hangs its hat on the notion that an “infringer” is someone who has been
adjudicated an infringer in court. Working from that baseline, Cox argues that “as a matter of
choice and not obligation, Cox applies its process to mere accusations involving its accounts.”
Defs.’ Opp’n at 15–16. In other words, Cox’s policy goes above and beyond what the DMCA
requires, so its failure to act based on notices of infringement cannot render Cox ineligible for
the safe harbor’s protection. Cox also argues that by not defining “appropriate circumstances”
Congress left it to the service provider to make its own determination of when such
circumstances exist.
Although Cox was under no duty to monitor for infringement, Cox did not have leeway
to wait until an account holder was adjudicated as an infringer to find that circumstances were
appropriate for termination. As explained above, the Court disagrees that a repeat infringer
policy applies only to those who have been held liable in a copyright suit. Rather, an account
holder must be considered an infringer, at minimum, when the service provider has actual
knowledge that the account holder is using its services for infringing purposes. Nor do service
providers have complete discretion to define “appropriate circumstances.” Appropriate
circumstances arise when an account holder is repeatedly or flagrantly infringing copyrights.
Thus, when Cox had actual knowledge of particular account holders who blatantly or repeatedly
infringed, the responsibility shifted to Cox to terminate their accounts.
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Cox makes the additional argument that knowledge of infringement cannot be established
by notices submitted by copyright holders. 19 Cox claims such notices are unreliable for a variety
of reasons. There is conflicting authority as to whether notices of infringement should be
considered evidence sufficient to give an ISP knowledge of a user’s infringement. See Disney
Enters., Inc., 2013 WL 6336286, at *22 (collecting cases and noting that “there is some
disagreement as to whether such notices equate to knowledge of a user’s actual infringement”).
Whether or not DMCA-compliant notices are sufficient, standing alone, to establish a service
provider’s knowledge for purposes of the statutory safe harbor, they are “powerful evidence of a
service provider’s knowledge.” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718
F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2013).
Moreover, the account holders referenced in the emails above had already been through
Cox’s entire graduated response procedure. That means Cox had received, not one or two, but at
least fourteen infringement notices tied to their accounts in a six-month period. And Cox
customer service representatives worked with the customers on each of their four “hard-walled
garden” suspensions to identify the cause of the infringement notices—including the possibilities
of malware, an unsecured wireless network, or a file-sharing program on another computer in the
19

Section § 512(c)(3)(A) lists the elements that copyright owners must include in a
notification of claimed infringement. Section 512(a), the safe harbor on which Cox relies, is the
only safe harbor that does not reference the notification provision in § 512(c). The absence of
the notification provision “make senses where an ISP merely acts as a conduit for infringing
material—rather than directly storing, caching, or linking to infringing material—because the
ISP has no ability to remove the infringing material from its system or disable access to the
infringing material.” In re Charter Commc’ns, 393 F.3d at 776; see also Recording Indus.
Assoc. of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1234–37 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Despite this, Cox concedes that it still requests the information specified in § 512(c)(3)(A) from
copyright owners. Defs.’ Opp’n at 18 (“While Section 512(a) does not call for notifications by
complainants or their processing by ISPs, Cox asks for information that a different provision,
Section 512(c)(3), specifies, because that is widely familiar.”). It should also be noted that the
tickets in the emails discussed above were a result of notices that Cox deemed DMCA-compliant
and had forwarded on to its account holders.
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household. By the time an account holder reaches the end of Cox’s graduated response
procedure, the chance that the account holder is not a willful infringer has substantially lessened.
Finally, and critically, the emails in the record reveal that Cox had knowledge that at least
some of its account holders were intentionally and repeatedly infringing. See, e.g., Theodore
Decl. Ex. 47 (“This customer is well aware of his actions and is upset that ‘after years of doing
this’ he is now getting caught. Customer was advised to shop sharing, check his wireless and
remove his PTP programs.” (emphases added)); id. Ex. 49 (“This Customer knows ‘it’s his
fault’ . . . .” (emphasis added)). As one court explained, “[a]lthough efforts to pin down exactly
what amounts to knowledge of blatant copyright infringement may be difficult, it requires, at a
minimum, that a service provider who receives a notice of a copyright violation be able to tell
merely from looking at the user’s activities, statements, or conduct that copyright infringement is
occurring.” Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1104–05. It is clear that Cox was able to tell from
these account holders’ statements and conduct that infringement was occurring. Yet, Cox
continued to provide service.
Implementation of a repeat-infringer policy is “unreasonable when service providers
fail[] to terminate users who ‘repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright.’” Capitol Records, LLC
v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1109).
Cox has not come forward with any evidence that would raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether it has done so. Accordingly, BMG is entitled to summary judgment on Cox’s safeharbor defense. If Cox is determined to be liable for contributory or vicarious copyright
infringement, BMG will not be limited in the remedies it seeks.
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C.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Cox moves for summary judgment on five grounds: (1) whether there is evidence of

direct infringement by third parties; (2) whether there is evidence of Cox’s contributory
infringement; (3) whether there is evidence of Cox’s vicarious liability; (4) whether BMG failed
to mitigate its damages; and (5) whether BMG’s unclean hands bar its claims. After a careful
review of the record in the light most favorable to BMG, the Court finds summary judgment on
any of the first four grounds is inappropriate. Issues of material fact remain for the jury to decide
at trial. The Court finds Cox’s unclean hands defense fails as a matter of law.
1.

Direct Copyright Infringement by Third Parties

BMG cannot hold Cox liable for contributory or vicarious infringement absent evidence
of underlying direct infringement. See Softech Worldwide, LLC v. Internet Tech. Broad. Corp.,
761 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375 (E.D. Va. 2011); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
2d 723, 731 (E.D. Va. 2003). Direct infringement requires proof of (1) ownership of a valid
copyright and (2) copying. Copying is established when any of the exclusive rights listed in
§ 106 are violated. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright . . . .”). In the complaint, BMG alleged
that its exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution, see §§ 106(1), (3), “are directly
infringed each time a Cox subscriber without authorization uploads or downloads through the
Cox system a recording that embodies a composition.” Am. Compl. at 12. Cox claims there is
no evidence in the record to support that allegation.
a.

Level of Specificity Required

It is undisputed that BMG has not identified a specific individual Cox account holder
who utilized a BitTorrent protocol on Cox’s internet service to upload or download music files

43

that infringed BMG’s copyrights. Cox believes this is a critical deficiency in BMG’s evidence.
In Cox’s view, BMG should have brought John Doe lawsuits and used subpoenas to establish at
least one account holder as a direct infringer. Cox argues Rightscorp’s identifications of IP
addresses associated with Cox accounts is insufficient to establish that any infringing act was
committed by a Cox account holder rather than some third party who tapped into the account
holder’s network—for example, a neighbor accessing an unsecured wireless network or a
babysitter on a Friday night.
The Court disagrees with Cox’s articulation of what is required of a copyright owner in a
secondary liability suit. First, imposing a rule that would require copyright owners to litigate
John Doe lawsuits before bringing claims of secondary liability would undermine a key purpose
of secondary liability claims. As the Supreme Court explained, “When a widely shared service
or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected
work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the
distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious
liability.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929–30; see also Aimster, 334 F.3d at 645.
Second, Cox’s argument ignores the fact that BMG may establish direct infringement
using circumstantial evidence that gives rise to an inference that Cox account holders or other
authorized users accessed its service to directly infringe. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas,
579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1225 (D. Minn. 2008) (“[D]irect proof of actual dissemination is not
required by the Copyright Act. Plaintiffs are free to employ circumstantial evidence to attempt
to prove [a violation].”). As explained more fully below, Rightscorp claims to have identified
2.5 million instances of Cox users making BMG’s copyrighted works available for download,
and Rightscorp itself downloaded approximately 100,000 full copies of BMG’s works using

44

Cox’s service. BMG has presented more than enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Cox account holders directly infringed its exclusive rights.
Cox tries to counter this by arguing that BMG cannot rely solely on evidence compiled
by Rightscorp because direct infringement requires a showing of volitional conduct by a third
party. See CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e
conclude that Netcom made a particularly rational interpretation of § 106 when it concluded that
a person had to engage in volitional conduct—specifically, the act of constituting infringement—
to become a direct infringer.”); see also Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536
F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008). Cox claims a plaintiff cannot rely on evidence of its own agent’s
volition. Courts have routinely rejected the argument that evidence of infringement gathered by
a copyright owner’s investigative agent cannot be used to establish infringement. See, e.g.,
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Walker, 704 F. Supp. 2d 460, 467 (W.D. Penn. 2010) (“It is
undisputed that MediaSentry [the copyright holder’s investigator] downloaded actual copies of
nine of the Copyrighted Recordings from Defendant’s computer, establishing unauthorized
distribution as to those nine recordings.”); Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216 (“The Court holds
that distribution to MediaSentry can form the basis of an infringement claim.”); Atl. Recording
Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 2008) (accepting that plaintiffs had proved
actual distribution of the copyrighted sound recordings that plaintiffs’ agent had downloaded);
Interscope Records v. Leadbetter, No. C05-1149, 2007 WL 1217705, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
23, 2007) (finding proof that MediaSentry downloaded copyrighted works was evidence of direct
infringement). Where a copyright owner has not licensed its agent to authorize distribution or
reproduction, the agent’s downloading of the works is not authorized and thus does not run afoul
of the general proposition that a copyright owner cannot infringe his own copyright. See
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Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 (“[A] copyright owner’s authorization of an investigator to
pursue infringement does not authorize the investigator to validate the third party’s unlawful
conduct.” (internal quotations and alteration omitted)); Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 985. Thus,
the fact that Rightscorp caused over 100,000 downloads of the copyrighted works is sufficient to
meet the volition requirement.
Finally, Cox makes much of the distinction between infringement by the individual
named on the account and infringement by other users with access to Cox service. Cox
overstates the import of the distinction. Taking a scenario posed by Cox at oral argument, it is
typical for each member of a multimember household to access the internet via an agreement
between Cox and one individual in the household. Certainly, evidence that any one of those
users infringed would be sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the individual’s name does not
appear on the bill. While identity is a key issue in many individual infringement suits, it has
little relevance in a large-scale secondary liability suit. On the other hand, Cox’s liability for
infringement over its network is not boundless. Cox is free to present evidence at trial that might
weaken any inference raised by BMG’s evidence of infringement. For instance, Cox can present
evidence of the prevalence of stolen access to wireless networks or what it believes to be
Rightscorp’s imprecise methods of identifying IP addresses.
b.

The Distribution Right

Cox devotes most of its argument to the scope of § 106(3)’s distribution right, arguing
that BMG’s evidence of Cox account holders making copyrighted works available for download
is insufficient to show distribution. Cox asserts that BMG must show actual dissemination of the
copyrighted works and that BMG has failed to do so. BMG responds that a “making available”
definition of distribution is the law in the Fourth Circuit, but that even under an “actual
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distribution” standard, there is sufficient evidence to establish infringement of its distribution
right.
Section 106(3) grants “the owner of copyright . . . the exclusive rights to . . . distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). The right was “largely dormant”
before the emergence of file-sharing technology. Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost
Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y 1, 6 (2011).
As copyright owners have increasingly relied on the distribution right in the digital age, district
courts and academia alike have split on how to define distribution.
One source of disagreement among courts is the question of how to understand early
cases that discussed the distribution right in contexts far afield from online file sharing. The
most commonly cited case in this debate comes from the Fourth Circuit. In Hotaling v. Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997), the church obtained an
authorized copy of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted research materials for its main library’s collection.
The church then made unauthorized microfiche copies of the research and sent the copies to its
branch libraries. Upon discovering a copy at one of the branches, the copyright owners sued,
alleging a violation of his distribution right. Because the library did not keep records of who
used the microfiche, the church argued that the plaintiffs could not establish distribution because
there was no evidence that a member of the public had ever used it. The Fourth Circuit
disagreed.
After stating the general principle that “[i]n order to establish ‘distribution’ of a
copyrighted work, a party must show that an unlawful copy was disseminated ‘to the public,’” id.
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at 203 (citing Nat’l Car Rental v. Computer Assocs., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993)), the
court held:
When a public library adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its index or
catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing or browsing
public, it has completed all the steps necessary for distribution to the public. At
that point, members of the public can visit the library and use the work. Were this
not to be considered distribution within the meaning of § 106(3), a copyright
holder would be prejudiced by a library that does not keep records of public use,
and the library would unjustly profit by its own omission.
Id.
The Fourth Circuit has never returned to its holding in Hotaling and thus has not had the
opportunity to consider whether evidence that sound recordings were made available for
download without authorization via BitTorrent would be enough to show distribution. Cf.
Menell, supra, at 8 (noting that Hotaling “arose in arcane circumstances far removed from the
file-sharing context”). BMG contends that Hotaling announced a broadly applicable “making
available” definition of distribution that applies equally to file-sharing and that the Court is
bound by that definition. While the Court is bound by Fourth Circuit precedent, the Court does
not read Hotaling as broadly as BMG urges.
The Hotaling court announced the definition of distribution when it said, “In order to
establish ‘distribution’ of a copyrighted work, a party must show that an unlawful copy was
disseminated ‘to the public.’” 118 F.3d at 203 (emphasis added). The court’s specific holding
that the plaintiffs established a distribution from the library was driven by equitable concerns
rather than an analysis of the statute. See Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d
234, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (characterizing Hotaling as “apparently motivated by equitable
principles” and grounded in “public policy”); Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (noting that the
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court “did not analyze any case law to support its conclusion” or “conduct any analysis of
§ 106(3)” but was instead “guided by equitable concerns”). As Goldstein explains:
Hotaling can also be understood as only a more limited decision on what is
required to prove distribution. Although the record on the summary judgment
appeal revealed no instances in which the library in fact loaned the infringing
copy to the public, the court observed that “members of the public can visit the
library and use the work,” and further that “[i]f, as the [defendant] Church says,
actual use by the public must be shown to establish distribution, no one can
expect a copyright holder to prove particular instances of use by the public when
the proof is impossible to produce because the infringing library has not kept
records of public use.
Goldstein on Copyright § 7.5.1 (3d ed. 2012 Supp.) (footnotes omitted); see also Patry on
Copyright § 13:9 (“[T]he majority’s decision can be saved only if it is read to rest on an
evidentiary probability that there had been an actual loan of the copy.”).
To be sure, some courts have construed the holding in Hotaling broadly and held that
making works available on file-sharing programs is distribution.20 See, e.g., Universal Studios
Prods. LLLP v. Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D. Me. 2006); Arista Records LLC v.
Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 970–71 (N.D. Tex. 2006). But “[t]he general rule, supported by
the great weight of authority, is that infringement of the distribution right requires an actual
dissemination of either copies or phonorecords.” Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (internal
quotations and alteration omitted); see also Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1225; London-Sire
Records, Inc. v. Doe, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166–67 (D. Mass. 2008); In re Napster, Inc.
Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 805 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Musical Prods., Inc. v. Roma’s
Record Corp., No. 05-cv-5903, 2007 WL 750319, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007). The Court
20

The Tenth Circuit recently relied on Hotaling in a case involving a library’s
distribution of a copyrighted work. See Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1202 n.7 (10th Cir.
2013). In a footnote, however, the court acknowledged that there has been “dissensus,
particularly among district courts, about the applicability of Hotaling’s holding to cases of
Internet file-sharing.” Id. The court found it unnecessary to “delve into the file-sharing issue”
because the case was factually on all fours with Hotaling. Id.
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joins those courts and holds that Hotaling did not announce a rule of general applicability, but
instead articulated a principle that applies only in cases where it is impossible for a copyright
owner to produce proof of actual distribution. See Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (explaining
Hotaling as reaching instances where proof of use by the public was impossible to produce);
Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4660, 2002 WL 1997918, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 29, 2002) (“While a copyright holder may not be required to prove particular instances of
use by the public when the proof is impossible to produce because the infringer has not kept
records of public use, see Hotaling, 188 F.3d at 204, in the present case there has been no
showing that the record companies did not have access to such data.”).
This reading of Hotaling is also consistent with the plain meaning of the statute.
Section 101 does not contain a further definition of distribution. Section 106(3) provides the
only relevant definition. A distribution occurs when a work is transferred to the public “by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). Thus,
Congress provided the list of specific transactions that will consummate a distribution. As Cox
notes, clearly missing from the list is an offer to sell, transfer, rent, lease, or lend a work. See
Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (“The scope of the term distribution is only defined within
§ 106(3) itself . . . .”); Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1217 (“Congress explains the manners in
which distribution can be effected: sale, transfer of ownership, rental, lease, or lending. The
provision does not state that an offer to do any of these acts constitutes distribution. Nor does
§ 106(3) provide that making a work available for any of these activities constitutes
distribution.”); Patry on Copyright § 13:9 (“Perhaps because the statute lists the types of
distribution covered, there is no definition of ‘distribution.’”).
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BMG argues in response that reading distribution to include a “making available” right is
consistent with other provisions in the Copyright Act. As examples, BMG cites the definition of
“publication” in § 101, which includes “offering to distribute copies,” and § 506(a)(1)(C), a
criminal provision that provides that “the distribution of a work” may be accomplished by
“making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public.” Courts have
debated whether the definition of “publication” in § 101 supports a broader reading of the
distribution right. Some courts have concluded that “distribution” and “publication” are
synonymous terms under the Copyright Act and, working from that baseline, use the definition
of “publication” to define “distribution.” This logic is flawed for several reasons.
At the threshold, the Court questions the evidence relied on by those courts that
purportedly establishes that distribution is interchangeable with publication. Those courts build
upon comments in legislative history as well as an excerpt from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). Legislative history
cannot override the plain meaning of “distribution” under § 106(3), however, and Harper & Row
involved a narrow discussion of first publication and not the meaning of distribution and
publication generally. Cf. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1219–20.
Nor does the definition of “publication” support a broader reading of the distribution
right. The Act defines “publication” as
the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute
copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution,
public performance, or public display, constitutes publication.
17 U.S.C. § 101. The first sentence of the definition tracks the language in § 106(3), making it
clear that all distributions are publications. It does not follow from that proposition that the
inverse—all publications are distributions—is also true. See Patry on Copyright § 13:11.50
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(noting that courts that assume the inverse is true fall within “the logical fallacy of affirming the
consequent” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The “offering to distribute” language forms an
additional category of publications that are not distributions. See London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d
at 169; see also Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (“A plain reading of the statute indicates that a
publication can be either a distribution or an offer to distribute for the purposes of further
distribution, but that a distribution must involve a ‘sale or other transfer of ownership,’ or a
‘rental, lease, or lending’ of a copy of the work.”). In short, § 101 provides no support for
BMG’s “making available” theory.
Section 506(a)(1)(C), a criminal provision that imposes penalties for “the distribution of a
work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network
accessible to members of the public,” likewise convinces the Court that its reading of § 106(3) is
correct. This provision and § 101 establish that “when Congress intends distribution to
encompass making available or offering to transfer, it has demonstrated that it is quite capable of
explicitly providing that in the statute.” Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
BMG makes three additional arguments for a “making available” interpretation that the
court finds equally unpersuasive. First, BMG says that “making available” is “the view of
definitive treatises.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 12. That is not correct. There is a split in the academic
debate, with Menell and Nimmer advocating for a “making available” right and Patry and
Goldstein advocating for actual distribution. 21 Menell and Nimmer rely heavily on legislative

21

Compare Menell, supra, at 67 (“[T]o prove a violation of copyright’s distribution
right, a copyright owner need merely show that a copyrighted work has been placed in a share
folder that is accessible to the public.”), and Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[B], with Paul
Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 7.5.1 (3d ed. 2005) (“[A]n actual transfer must take place; a
mere offer for sale will not infringe the right.”), and William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright §
13:11.50 (2015) (“[T]he mere offering to distribute a copy work does not violate section
106(3).”). Earlier versions of Nimmer on Copyright endorsed an actual dissemination reading of
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history for their expansive reading of the distribution right. The Court has already reviewed the
statutory language and found it plain and unambiguous. Legislative history may not be used “to
muddy clear statutory language.” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011); see also
Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d 1473, 1482 (4th Cir. 1996) (“If the language is plain and
unambiguous, we look no further.”). The Court leaves any further debate to academia.
BMG also argues that interpreting the right broadly is essential to comport with the
United States’s obligations under the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)
Copyright Treaty. While the WIPO Treaty does recognize a “making available” right, the treaty
is “not self-executing and [it] lack[s] any binding legal authority separate from [its]
implementation through the Copyright Act.” Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226; see also
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (stating that treaties “are not domestic law unless
Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it
be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on those terms”). Moreover, courts employ the so-called
Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation only when “constru[ing] ambiguous statutes to
avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations.” F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (emphasis added); see also Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). As already explained, the statute is
unambiguous. “[I]f a statute makes plain Congress’s intent, a court must enforce the intent of
Congress irrespective of whether the statute conforms to customary international law.” United
States v. Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

the statute. See 2 David Nimmer & Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[A]
(2007) (“Infringement . . . requires an actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords.”);
see also Rick Sanders, Will Professor Nimmer’s Change of Heart on File Sharing Matter?, 15
Vanderbilt J. Ent. & L. 857, 865 (2013) (noting that the “copyright treatises were unanimous
until recently”).
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also Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (concluding that “concern for U.S. compliance with the
WIPO treat[y] . . . cannot override the clear congressional intent in § 106(3)”).
Finally, BMG points to a letter written by Marybeth Peters, the former Register of
Copyrights, that embraces a “making available” reading of the statute. See Letter from Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights, to Rep. Howard L. Berman (Sept. 25, 2002). The opinions
expressed in the letter have no controlling weight and the Court does not consider them. See
Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d at 242–43 n.7 (declining to rely on the Peters letter);
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1217 (“[O]pinion letters from the Copyright Office to Congress on
matters of statutory interpretation are not binding and are ‘entitled to respect insofar as they are
persuasive.’” (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 F.3d 762, 778 (6th
Cir. 2005))).
Although the Court agrees with Cox up to this point, Cox makes two additional
arguments regarding the contours of the distribution right that the Court does not accept. First,
Cox contends “copies or phonorecords” cover only tangible, material objects and the distribution
right is not infringed by electronic, rather than physical, transfers. Second, Cox argues that the
transactional language in the statute—“by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending”—requires that there be a consummated “transfer” of copy or phonorecord and that
there is no evidence of such a transfer in this case. The Court believes Cox is mistaken on both
counts.
The distribution right extends only to “copies” and “phonorecords.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
Phonorecords are “material objects in which sounds . . . are . . . fixed by any method now known
or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
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communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 22 Id. § 101. A work is
“fixed” if it is “in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.” Id. Although Cox equates the phrase “material object” with a physical object, in fact
“any object in which a sound recording can be fixed is a ‘material object.’” London-Sire, 542 F.
Supp. 2d at 171. And that includes electronic files. Id. at 170 (“It makes no difference that the
distribution occurs electronically, or that the items are electronic sequences of data rather than
physical objects.”); id. at 173 (restating that “‘material objects’ should not be understood as
separating tangible copies from non-tangible copies”); see also Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish
Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.
2013) (“In the electronic context, copies may be distributed electronically.”); Greubel, 453
F. Supp. 2d at 968 (noting that “courts have not hesitated to find copyright infringement by
distribution in cases of file-sharing or electronic transmission of copyrighted works”).
Not only can electronic files be “material objects,” but transferring files using a
BitTorrent protocol satisfies the transactional element of distribution. Section 106(3) requires a
distribution “by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” While
BitTorrent transfers do not fit within our ordinary conception of a “transfer of ownership”
because the transferor retains his or her own copy of the file, the Court finds the London-Sire
court’s reasoning on this issue persuasive. “[I]t is the newly minted ownership rights held by the
transferee that concern it, not whether the transferor gives up his own.” 542 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
22

The definition of “copies” is the same except that they are “material objects, other
than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed.” § 101 (emphasis added); see also London-Sire,
542 F. Supp. 2d at 165 n.14 (“The two terms appear to be functionally interchangeable . . .,
differing only in the nature of the copyrighted work.”).
55

In other words, what matters is that “when the transaction is completed, the distributee has a
material object.” Id. at 174.
In sum, to establish a direct infringement of its distribution right, BMG must show an
actual dissemination of a copyrighted work. BMG contends that even under this standard, it has
produced more than enough evidence to show actual dissemination. First, Rightscorp identified
Cox subscribers sharing torrents that Rightscorp had also found on torrent indexing websites.
Because each torrent contains a unique “hash,” an identifying code that is only created once,
BMG argues these Cox users must have downloaded the torrents at some point. Second,
Rightscorp downloaded over 700,000 copies of copyrighted works from Cox subscribers using
Cox’s internet service and 100,000 of those copies were of the works at issue in this case. 23
Third, Rightscorp says it identified 2.5 million instances in which Cox users made available the
copyrighted works for downloading. BMG argues that even if this “making available” evidence
is not direct evidence of distribution, it is circumstantial evidence that the works were in fact
downloaded given the way a BitTorrent protocol operates. See London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at
169 (finding it is reasonable to infer that distribution actually took place “where the defendant
has completed all the necessary steps for public distribution”); see also Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d
at 983.
The Court finds BMG has demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether its distribution right was directly infringed.

23

Cox’s expert concluded that “the samples that Rightscorp collected revealed multiple
errors in its software’s detection process.” Reply at 10 n.3. The reliability of the samples will be
a factual issue for the jury to weigh.
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2.

Contributory Infringement

A contributory infringer is one who, (1) “with knowledge of the infringing activity,”
(2) “induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.” CoStar Grp.,
Inc., 373 F.3d at 550 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). BMG’s claim is that Cox knew, had reason to know, or was
willfully blind to its users’ infringement and materially contributed to that infringement. Cox
raises two general challenges to BMG’s claim. First, Cox contends that only an inducement
theory of contributory infringement survived the Supreme Court’s decision in Metro–Goldwin–
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Because BMG concedes for
purposes of summary judgment that there is no evidence that Cox induced infringement, see
Defs.’ SUMF 8, Cox asks for summary judgment. Second, even if the Court finds a “material
contribution” theory is still viable, Cox argues that BMG has no evidence that Cox knew of the
specific infringing activity at issue in this case.
a.

Effect of Grokster

The Court finds no support for Cox’s reading of Grokster. Grokster clarified the scope of
inducement; it did not explicitly or implicitly reject a material contribution theory of liability. 24
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. CV 11-07098, 2014 WL 8628031, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 14, 2014) (rejecting the same argument); see also Goldstein on Copyright § 8.0 (3d ed.

24

The Grokster Court said that “[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing
or encouraging direct infringement.” 545 U.S. at 930 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.3d at 1162). Cox
contends this language displaced the “older formulation” of contributory infringement articulated
by the Second Circuit in Gershwin Publishing Corporation (and quoted above) that a
contributory infringer is one who “with knowledge of the infringing activity induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.” 443 F.2d at 1162. Far from
implying any disapproval of Gershwin, however, the Supreme Court cited favorably to Gershwin
in support of its assertion.
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2011 Supp.) (noting that Grokster “gave prominence to the inducement branch of contributory
liability” (emphasis added)). The Court also finds it persuasive that in the wake of Grokster
courts have continued to articulate both inducement and material contribution theories of
contributory infringement. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171
n.11 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court in Grokster did not suggest that a court must find
inducement in order to impose contributory liability under common law principles.”).
b.

Knowledge

Cox argues that even if a “material contribution” theory survived Grokster, BMG cannot
succeed because there is no evidence that Cox had knowledge of infringing activity. 25 The
knowledge requirement is met by a showing of actual or constructive knowledge or by evidence
that a defendant took deliberate actions to willfully blind itself to specific infringing activity. 26
See Softech Worldwide, LLC v. Internet Tech. Broad. Corp., No. 1:10cv651, 2010 WL 4645791,
at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 8, 2010); Seoul Broad. Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Young Min Ro, No. 1:09cv433,
2011 WL 3207024, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2011) (stating that plaintiffs were “at the very
least . . . willfully blind to the possibility” of infringement and thus were liable for contributory
infringement).

25

Cox did not raise BMG’s ability to establish the second “material contribution”
element until its reply brief. Accordingly, the Court declines to reach the issue of whether there
is sufficient evidence of Cox’s contribution to the alleged infringement.
26

Some courts have abandoned constructive knowledge in the online context and instead
required plaintiffs to establish “actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement.” Luvdarts,
LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001)). Absent any indication from the Fourth
Circuit to the contrary, the Court declines to alter the contributory infringement standard. Cox
will be liable if it knew or had reason to know of direct infringement. The Court may permit the
jury to be asked whether Cox had actual or constructive knowledge of, or was willfully blind to,
specific acts of infringement by interrogatory.
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BMG asserts that Cox had knowledge of its users’ infringing activity because Rightscorp
sent Cox more than two million infringement notices pertaining to its copyrighted works.
Despite Cox’s arguments to the contrary, DMCA-compliant notices are evidence of knowledge.
See Capitol Records, LLC, 2015 WL 1402049, at *43; Giganews, Inc., 2014 WL 8628031, at *7;
see also Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 (stating in another context that notices are “the
most powerful evidence of a service provider’s knowledge”). This case presents an unusual fact
pattern, however, because it is undisputed that Cox never received Rightscorp’s notices related to
BMG’s copyrights during the period covered by the Complaint. Cox began blocking
Rightscorp’s notices at the server level in 2011, meaning not only did Cox not receive the
notices, it also has no record of receiving them. 27 The notices relevant to this litigation were not
sent until 2012.
BMG argues that Cox’s unreasonable decision not to receive Rightscorp’s notices gave
Cox reason to know of the infringing activity. In support, BMG draws a comparison to Ellison v.
Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). In that case, AOL changed the email address it used
to accept infringement notices but did not immediately register the change with the U.S.
Copyright Office or put a mechanism in place to forward or return messages received at its old
address. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause there [was] evidence indicating that AOL
changed its e-mail address in an unreasonable manner and that AOL should have been on notice
of infringing activity,” a trier of fact could find AOL had reason to know of the infringing
27

Cox contends the notices are not evidence of knowledge because even had Cox
received them, the notices were deficient. But Cox’s in-house counsel, who set Cox’s policy not
to accept Rightscorp’s notices, testified that the notices were “generally consistent” with the
DMCA in all other respects, see Allan Decl. Ex. 2, and Cox has repeatedly asserted in this
litigation that if Rightscorp had only agreed to delete the settlement language from the notices,
they would have been forwarded to Cox account holders. At this stage of the litigation, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to BMG, the Court finds a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that had Cox received the notices, they would be evidence of infringing activity.
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activity occurring. Id. at 1077. BMG says Cox’s blacklisting of its notices was similarly
unreasonable and that, as in Ellison, there is other evidence in the record that put Cox on notice
of specific infringing activity.
First, BMG claims that when Cox refused to forward its notices, it gave Cox access to a
searchable and sortable “dashboard” that contained all of the information pertaining to the
alleged infringements occurring at each IP address. Although Cox received an email from
Rightscorp with instructions on how to access the dashboard, Cox maintains that it never in fact
accessed the dashboard and thus it could not have been a source of knowledge. Second, BMG
says after Cox blocked Rightscorp’s notices, Rightscorp sent emails to Zabek, the abuse group,
and Cox’s in-house privacy counsel identifying IP addresses with a significant amount of
infringing activity. See Allan Decl. Exs. 14, 61. Finally, BMG reprises the statements by
members of Cox’s abuse group discussed above that describe specific customers with phrases
like “habitual abuser” or “well aware of his actions.” 28 Id. Exs. 28, 40.
Considering all of this together, the Court finds a reasonable jury could conclude that
Cox’s refusal to accept Rightscorp’s notices was unreasonable and that additional notice
provided to Cox gave it reason to know of the allegedly infringing activity on its network.
c.

Willful Blindness

BMG also argues that the record establishes Cox’s willful blindness to the direct
infringement. As noted above, willful blindness is the equivalent of knowledge in copyright law.

28

Cox attempts to characterize these emails as merely acknowledging the presence of
widespread infringement on the internet. The Court disagrees. These emails show Cox
employees discussing specific interactions with individual Cox account holders regarding what
Cox employees believed was specific infringing activity. Even if these emails would not be
sufficient standing alone to establish knowledge, they strengthen the inference that Cox’s
knowledge of infringement went beyond the mere possibility that its service was being used for
infringement.
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See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650. “A person is ‘willfully blind’ or engages in ‘conscious avoidance’
amounting to knowledge where the person was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute
and consciously avoided confirming that fact.” Viacom Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 35 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Willful blindness requires more than negligence or recklessness. See
Luvdarts, LLC, 710 F.3d at 1073. There must be evidence that the defendant took “deliberate
actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have
actually known the critical facts.” Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. S.B.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070
(2011) (addressing willful blindness in the context of patent infringement).
BMG argues that Cox’s failure to terminate repeat infringers from its service and its
deliberate avoidance of Rightscorp’s notices establishes its willful blindness. In response, Cox
points to the actions it does take when it receives what it considers proper infringement notices.
Cox says that it forwards hundreds of thousands of infringement notices annually, that it works
with account holders to identify and stop the activities causing the notices, and that it suspends
and when necessary terminates account holders. But this generalized evidence that Cox does not
always turn a blind eye to infringement, does not mean that it has never done so. Cf. MP3tunes,
LLC, 2013 WL 1987225, at *3 (“[Defendant’s] ability to identify repeat infringers does not mean
that it never looked the other way when confronted by a high probability that certain conduct was
infringing.”). Cox also argues that BMG cannot show that its decision to block Rightscorp
notices was made with the intent to avoid knowledge of infringement because Cox works with
complainants to remove “improper language” from notices. Because Cox offered to do the same
with Rightscorp’s notices, Cox argues there is no evidence that it was deliberately avoiding
knowledge of illegal activity. While this would certainly be a reasonable inference for a jury to
draw, it is not the only inference available.
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BMG paints a very different picture of a company unhappy with the burdens of
complying with the DMCA and using the settlement offers in Rightscorp’s notices as a red
herring to distract from its goal of reducing the number of infringement notices Cox receives.
Given the evidence, this is also a justifiable inference. It will be the jury’s task, not the Court’s,
to weigh the evidence and choose among the competing inferences. See Columbia Union Coll. v.
Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 164 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Where the party challenging the grant of summary
judgment can show that the inferences they suggest are reasonable in light of the competing
inferences, summary judgment must be denied.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3.

Vicarious Infringement

BMG also alleges that Cox is liable for vicarious infringement. A variant on respondeat
superior, vicarious liability holds a defendant accountable for third-party infringement if he
“(1) possessed the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity; and (2) possessed an
obvious and direct financial interest in the exploited copyrighted materials.” Nelson–Salabes,
Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 2002). Unlike contributory
infringement, vicarious liability is not based on the knowledge or intent of the defendant. It is
entirely dependent on the existence of a financial benefit and the defendant’s relationship to the
infringement. See Arista Records, LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 156 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); see also EMI Apr. Music, Inc. v. White, 618 F. Supp. 2d 497, 507 (E.D. Va. 2009) (noting
that a lack of knowledge of direct infringement “is not a defense where both elements are
satisfied”).
a.

Right and Ability to Supervise

The first element requires that the defendant “declin[ed] a right to stop or limit” the direct
infringement. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930. Cox expressly retains the right in its AUP to suspend
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or terminate its account holders’ access to internet service. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 37
(“Under the common law vicarious liability standard, the ability to block infringers’ access to a
particular environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of the right and ability to
supervise.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Thus, Cox has the contractual
right to condition the availability of its internet access to users who do not use that service to
violate copyrights. If users listen when Cox exercises that power, infringement stops. If users
do not and Cox terminates them, that also stops or at least limits infringement.
In addition to its legal control, Cox also has the practical ability to stop or limit
infringement. There cannot be any serious dispute that internet service is an essential component
of the infringing activity alleged by BMG. File-sharing programs are completely dependent on
the internet to facilitate the download and upload of files. It is therefore a reasonable inference
that the result of an internet service provider exercising its ability to suspend or terminate
account holders stops or limits infringement.
Cox maintains that despite a legal right to stop or limit infringing activity by terminating
accounts, there must also be evidence in the record that Cox’s current architecture would allow it
to exercise physical control over the infringing activity. Cox reasons that the provision of
general internet service is much different than the swap market in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996), where the defendant not only had the right to
terminate vendors, but also “controlled the access of customers to the swap meet area.” It is also
distinguishable, Cox contends, from defendants like Napster, which had “the ability to locate
infringing material listed on its search indices.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
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In support, Cox relies on two more recent cases from the Ninth Circuit, Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007), and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International
Service Association, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007). This Court is of course not bound by either
decision, nor does the Court find the reasoning in those decisions warrants summary judgment
here. In Amazon, the owner of copyrighted images sued Google unsuccessfully on two theories
of vicarious liability. The first was that Google was vicariously liable for linking search results
to third-party websites that contained the infringing images. The Ninth Circuit found the
“control” element was missing because the plaintiff “ha[d] not shown that Google has contracts
with third-party websites that empower Google to stop or limit them from reproducing,
displaying, and distributing infringing copies” of the infringing images. 508 F.3d at 1173. The
second theory was that Google had control via contracts underlying its AdSense program,
through which owners of websites register to have Google place relevant advertising on their
sites. The contracts permitted Google to terminate partnerships for copyright violations. Despite
the right to terminate, the court found it did not in practice give Google “the right to stop direct
infringement by third-party websites.” Id. at 1173–74.
By contrast, here Cox has the contractual right to control, which allows it to stop or limit
individuals from infringing BMG’s copyrights. Moreover, unlike the scenario in which Google
terminated a contract with an AdSense partner, when Cox terminates or suspends the relationship
with an account holder, it takes away an essential component of direct infringement. When an
AdSense partner was terminated, the only result was that the ads were no longer sourced by
Google. It would have no effect on how the website worked. Without the internet, individuals
cannot upload or download illegal content.
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In Visa, the Ninth Circuit held that Visa could not be vicariously liable for processing
credit card payments on websites hosting infringing conduct. The court’s holding was grounded
in a concern that vicarious liability may be extended to entities whose ability to take steps against
infringement would have only an “indirect effect of reducing infringing activity on the Internet at
large.” 494 F.3d at 803. The court believed that were Visa to exercise its contractual right to
terminate relationships, it would exert at most “indirect economic pressure.” Id. at 805. Here,
the connection cannot be described as indirect. When Cox exercises its contractual right, Cox
blocks a direct infringer’s access to the internet. That individual is thereafter precluded from
participation in the infringing activity. The Visa court even reasoned that Visa could only “block
access to their payment system, but they cannot themselves block access to the Internet, to any
particular websites, or to search engines enabling the location of such websites.” Id. (emphasis
added).
Nor does the Court agree with the Visa court’s attempt to distinguish cases like Fonovisa
and Napster where the defendant has physical control over the infringing activity. As Judge
Kozinski explained in his dissent, “[p]hysical control over the infringing activity is one way to
stop infringers, but it’s certainly not the only way. Withdrawing crucial services, such as
financial support, can be just as effective, and sometimes more effective, than technical measures
that can often be circumvented.” Id. at 821 (Kozinzki, J., dissenting).
In sum, Cox has a contractual relationship with its users and that relationship gives Cox
the legal right to withhold service in the face of infringing conduct. Cox also provides a crucial
service to the infringements alleged in this case, which gives Cox the practical ability to stop or
limit infringement. That is enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether BMG
can establish the first element of its vicarious liability claim.
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b.

Direct Financial Interest

The second element requires a “causal relationship between the infringing activity and
any financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless of how substantial the benefit is in proportion
to a defendant’s overall profits.” Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079 (emphasis omitted). Financial
benefit can be shown by evidence that “users are attracted to a defendant’s product because it
enables infringement, and that use of the product for infringement financially benefits the
defendant.” Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
To show users’ attraction, a plaintiff must only establish that “the availability of infringing
material acts as a ‘draw’ for customers.” A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1023 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[T]he law is clear that to constitute a direct financial benefit, the
‘draw’ of infringement need not be the primary, or even a significant, draw—rather, it only need
be ‘a’ draw.” Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 157. While the draw need not be significant,
the requisite causal connection must be between “the infringing activities at issue in th[e] case
and a direct financial benefit” to the defendant. Giganews, Inc., 2014 WL 8628031, at *4.
Cox provides a content-neutral commercial service that makes a wide selection of
services and activities available to its subscribers, including email, social networking, web
surfing, gaming, P2P file sharing, and more. See Allan Decl. Ex. 37. Cox charges the same flat
monthly fees to its users whether they use Cox’s service for infringing or non-infringing
purposes. Those “flat periodic payments for service . . . ordinarily would not constitute receiving
a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,” unless “the value of the service
lies in providing access to infringing material.” Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079 (alteration omitted)
(quoting S. Rep. 105–90, at 44). Thus, the relevant inquiry “where a service provider obtains
revenue from ‘subscribers,’” as here, is “whether the infringing activity constitutes a draw for
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subscribers, not just an added benefit.” Fung, 710 F.3d at 1044 (quoting Ellison, 357 F.3d at
1079) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, Cox’s receipt of monthly fees is only
evidence of direct financial benefit if some portion of those fees is generated from subscribers
that are drawn to Cox’s service at least in part because of the infringing activity alleged in this
case. Without that evidence, the requisite causal connection between the benefit and the
infringing activity is not established.
BMG offers evidence of the “draw” of infringing activity in the form of a survey
conducted by its expert, Stephen Nowlis. The study of Cox internet subscribers concluded that
16% of subscribers “download or upload free digital music through sites such as ThePirateBay,
KickAssTorrents, and Torrentz,” and of that 16%, 70% characterized the ability to do so as a
reason they subscribe to Cox.29 Pls.’ Opp’n at 25 (citing Nowlis Decl. Ex. 2 at 4 n.2). While
this evidence is hardly overwhelming, 30 it is also not clearly insufficient to satisfy the legal
standard. At this stage, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to BMG, the Court finds
a close question remains and reasonable minds could differ. Accordingly, summary judgment is
inappropriate. See Walker v. Mod U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2014). A
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that some percentage of Cox customers were drawn to
Cox’s internet service at least in part to download music, including BMG’s copyrighted works,
using BitTorrent.

29

Cox raised multiple challenges to Nowlis’s survey in a Daubert motion. (Dkt. No.
477). The Court denied the motion on the ground that any deficiencies identified go to the
weight of the survey and not its admissibility. (Dkt. No. 691).
30

BMG’s only other evidence that subscribers chose Cox or retained their subscriptions
to Cox because of the availability of infringing material is in the form of screenshots of message
boards on the website Reddit. BMG presents no explanation as to how these hearsay statements
would be admissible or authenticated, and the Court does not consider them.
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4.

Mitigation of Damages

Cox also raises BMG’s alleged failure to mitigate its damages as a ground for summary
judgment. Specifically, Cox argues BMG failed to mitigate by declining to modify Rightscorp’s
infringement notices and by failing to pursue other sources of infringement. BMG has elected to
only pursue statutory damages. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (“[T]he copyright owner may elect, at
any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an
award of statutory damages . . . .”). District courts are divided on the question of whether a
plaintiff’s election of statutory damages invalidates a failure-to-mitigate defense. The Court
agrees with those courts to hold that it does not. A plaintiff’s actual damages are a relevant
consideration in determining statutory damages under the Copyright Act. 31 See Malibu Media,
LLC v. Guastaferro, Julien, No. 1:14-cv-1544, 2015 WL 4603065, at *5 (E.D. Va. July 28,
2015). Because actual damages are relevant, so too are the actions a plaintiff took to mitigate
those damages.
To the extent failure to mitigate damages is applicable to the award of statutory damages,
a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether BMG in fact failed to mitigate its
damages.
5.

Unclean Hands

Finally, Cox contends that BMG’s unclean hands bar its claims. Courts, including the
Fourth Circuit, have “on occasion invoke[d] the equitable doctrine of unclean hands as a defense

31

When statutory damages are penal in nature, the focus is “necessarily on the
[defendant’s] actions and not the [plaintiff’s].” Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1507 (10th Cir.
2004) (finding mitigation inapplicable to statutory damages under ERISA because they are
penal). Statutory damages under the Copyright Act are not penal. Instead, they are aimed at
compensating copyright owners and deterring future infringing conduct.
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in a copyright infringement action.” 32 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.09[B]; see also Tempo
Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503, 507–08 (4th Cir. 1969). “A court can deny relief under the
doctrine of unclean hands only when there is a close nexus between a party’s unethical conduct
and the transactions on which that party seeks relief.” In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 810 (4th
Cir. 2001) (citing Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933)),
abrogated on other grounds by Bullock v. Bankchampaign, N.A., 135 S. Ct. 1753 (2013).
Moreover, an unclean hands defense “requires the defendant to show that he himself has been
injured by the plaintiff’s conduct.” Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1294 (4th Cir. 1978).
Evidence that the wrong was done to some third party is insufficient. See id. at 1294 n.7 (citing
J. Pomeroy, A Treaty on Equity Jurisprudence § 399). Given these limitations, the defense has
been “recognized only rarely, when the plaintiff’s transgression is of serious proportions and
relates directly to the subject matter of the infringement action.” Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v.
PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 990–91 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright
§ 13.09[B]).
Cox argues BMG has unclean hands for two reasons. Cox first claims BMG “failed to
supervise [its agent] Rightscorp and cast a blind eye towards its extortionate scheme to profit
from threats to cut off Internet service.” Defs.’ Memo. in Supp. at 27. The only conduct by
Rightscorp with a direct nexus to this litigation is the inclusion of settlement offers in the notices
sent to Cox. The Court finds the notices are not evidence of “misconduct rising to the level of
fraud, deceit, unconscionability or bad faith.” ABC, Inc. v. PrimeTime 24, Joint Venture, 17

32

Although it is an equitable defense, courts have applied the doctrine to preclude both
equitable relief and damages at law. See Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503, 507 n.8 (4th
Cir. 1969); see also 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.09[B] (“This equitable defense has been
held available in a copyright infringement action regardless of whether the action is one at law or
in equity.”).
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F. Supp. 2d 478, 484 (M.D.N.C. 1998), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 184 F.3d 348 (4th Cir.
1999). Cox’s remaining allegations, which amount to general attacks on Rightscorp’s business
model, are all directed towards Rightscorp’s treatment of third parties. None of these alleged
practices resulted in any injury to Cox or any Cox customer and thus cannot form the basis of an
unclean hands defense. Cf. Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357,
379 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The unclean hands doctrine is used to defeat an undeserving plaintiff’s
claim for equitable relief against a defendant that he has injured.” (emphasis added)); Lawler,
569 F.3d at 1294 (“The only wrong [plaintiff] committed was against third parties.”); see also In
re Uwimana, 274 F.3d at 810–11 (“We are not open to arguments about a party’s general moral
fitness . . . .”).
Cox next submits that BMG is not entitled to relief because Rightscorp downloaded
thousands of sound recordings and there is no evidence that Rightscorp had authorization to do
so from the owners of the sound recording copyrights (as opposed to authorization from BMG,
which owns the musical composition copyrights). However, “use of . . . undercover
investigators and the like to ferret out infringement is routine, and provides no defense.” 4-13
Nimmer on Copyright § 13.09[B] (citing Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 930 (N.D.
Cal. 1996)). Moreover, the downloading did not personally injure Cox. Thus, this conduct
cannot be used as the basis of an unclean hands defense. Cf. Positive Black Talk Inc., 394 F.3d
at 379. Accordingly, the Court finds Cox’s unclean hands defense fails as a matter of law.
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